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I. INTRODUCTION
The doctrine of punitive damages truly is an ancient legal con-
cept that inexplicably has evaded commitment to the archives of
history. Irrespective of the questionable validity of the doctrine at
early common law, the simple fact remains that none of the histor-
ical justifications supports the punitive damage theory in today's
tort reparations system. The quest to bestow increasing compensa-
tion no longer can justify punitive damage awards because actual
damages currently recoverable compensate plaintiffs more than ad-
equately for every conceivable element of physical, emotional, or
imagined injury. The desire to inflict punishment, likewise, repre-
sents an insupportable basis for awarding quasi-criminal fines in a
civil context, and is inconsistent with ancient and modern jurispru-
dence because the civil law historically has been premised upon the
concept of compensation and not penal retribution. Deterrence is
an equally unsound basis upon which to establish a civil remedy.
Unfortunately, theoretical arguments mask the archaic and de-
structive nature of the punitive damages doctrine. Considering
that an award of punitive damages is actually counterproductive to
the bases which originally provided credibility for its existence, the
severe economic impact of mind boggling and unprecedented re-
cent awards of punitive damages, and the potential for even more
catastrophic economic consequences in the future, it is time to rel-
egate this doctrine to its rightful niche in the annals of law.
Part II of this Article traces the evolution of the punitive dam-
age theory, including ancient origins and current status. Part III
explores the various justifications theorized in support of the doc-
trine's present viability. Part IV analyzes the patchwork applica-
tions and conflicting standards that measure conduct warranting
an award of punitive damages, the treatment of vicariously liable
corporate defendants, and other factors that affect the doctrine.
This part emphasizes that punitive damages are awarded on the
basis of highly questionable rationale and in an absurdly confusing
1118 [Vol. 37:1117
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and noticeably destructive manner. Part V argues for the complete
abolition of the punitive damage concept: ratio potest allegari
deficiente lege. In the absence of complete abolition of punitive
damages, part VI asserts the urgent need for immediate stringent
limitations on a doctrine that currently operates as an undis-
ciplined and unfettered juggernaut of destruction in the civil tort
system. Responsible jurisprudence, however, argues forcefully in
favor of relegating this legal dinosaur to an era that long since has
passed.
II. THE EVOLUTION OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES
A. Ancient Origins and Early Common Law
The precursor of modern punitive damages was the statutory
remedy of multiple awards, a practice that, like punitive damages,
provided for awards in excess of actual harm.1 One of the earliest
systems of law to utilize civil punitive damages was the Code of
Hammurabi in 2000 B.C.2 Punitory forms of damages also ap-
peared in the Hittite law in 1400 B.C. and in the Hindu Code of
Manu in 200 B.C.3 Even the Bible contains several examples of
multiple damage remedies that Mosaic law provided for offenses
such as stealing.4 Commentators disagree over whether Roman
civil law ever actually recognized the concept of punitive damages.5
English courts before the eighteenth century, however, upheld jury
verdicts that exceeded the plaintiff's actual physical harm,6 and an
1. K. REDDEN, PUNIIVE DAMAGES § 2.2(A)(1)(1980).
2. See, e.g., id.; G. DRnva & J. MLES, THE BABYLoNuN LAWS 500-01 (1952); Sales,
The Emergence of Punitive Damages in Product Liability Actions: A Further Assault on
the Citadel, 14 ST. MARY's L.J. 351, 351 n.1 (1983); Special Project, An Analysis of the
Legal, Social, and Political Issues Raised by Asbestos Litigation, 36 VAD. L. Rzv. 573, 691
(1983).
3. K. REDDEN, supra note 1, § 2.2(A)(1).
4. See, e.g., Exodus 22:1 (King James) ("If a man shall steal an ox, or a sheep, and kill
it, or sell it, he shall restore five oxen for an ox, and four sheep for a sheep."); Exodus 22.9
(King James) ("For all manner of trespass, whether it be for ox, for ass, for sheep, for rai-
ment, or for any manner of lost thing, which another challengeth to be his, the cause of both
parties shall come before the judges; and whom the judges shall condemn, he shall pay
double unto his neighbour."). Mosaic law also provided for recovery of multiple damages for
adultery and usury. See K. REDDEN, supra note 1, § 2.2(A)(1).
5. See, Sales, supra note 2, at 353 (Roman civil law recognized punitive damages) (cit-
ing Walther & Plein, Punitive Damages: A Critical Analysis: Kirk v. Combs, 49 MARQ. L.
REv. 369, 369 (1965)); see also W. BucKLAN & A. McNAxa, ROMAN LAW AND COMMON LAW
344-45 (2d ed. 1952) (asserting that the basis of Roman civil law was punitive in nature); K.
REDDEN, supra note 1, § 2.2(A)(1) (Roman law provided for multiple damage awards for
injurious acts characterized by wanton willfulness or conscious deliberation);
6. K. REDDEN, supra note 1, § 2.2(A)(2).
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English court initially employed the term "exemplary damages" in
1763 in Huckle v. Money7 to recognize that a jury legitimately
could return a verdict for excessive monetary awards.'
Courts and commentators have proferred a variety of histori-
cal justifications for the development of punitive damages.9 One
theory postulates that courts used the concept of punitive damages
to justify otherwise excessive jury verdicts.10 Early English com-
mon-law juries consisted of local townspeople who knew more
about the facts of cases than did the judges, and under the reign of
Henry II the knights who acted as jurors also provided the only
testimony at the trial." Primitive English courts, therefore, only
reluctantly interfered with the ostensibly knowledgeable decisions
reached by English juries, 2 and the concept that damages pos-
7. 95 Eng. Rep. 768 (C.P. 1763).
8. Id. at 769. The plaintiff in Huckle sued the King's officers for illegal searches and
seizures, assault, and false imprisonment under a "nameless warrant," and the court upheld
an award of 300 pounds for "exemplary damages" even though actual damages were only 20
pounds. Id. In the related case of Wilkes v. Wood, 98 Eng. Rep. 489 (C.P. 1763), Lord Chief
Justice Pratt stated that:
[A] jury have it in their power to give damages for more than the injury received.
Damages are designed not only as a satisfaction to the injured person, but likewise as a
punishment to the guilty, to deter from any such proceeding for the future, and hs a
proof of the detestation of the jury to the action itself.
Id. at 498-99.
9. See generally J. GHIAni & J. KmcHER, PuNrIVE DAMAGES LAW AND PRACGcE
§ 1.02 (1984); Cooter, Economic Analysis of Punitive Damages, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 79, 90
(1982); Duffy, Punitive Damages: A Doctrine Which Should Be Abolished, reprinted in
DEFENSE RESEARCH INSTrrTuE: THE CA E AGAINST PuNrrivE DAMAGES (D. Hirsch & J. Pouros
eds. 1969); Owen, Civil Punishment and the Public Good, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 103, 108
(1982); Sales, supra note 2, at 353-55.
10. Duffy, supra note 9, at 4; Ellis, Fairness and Efficiency in the Law of Punitive
Damages, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 12-13 (1982); Sales, supra note 2, at 353-54. A number of
early cases in which defendants attempted to persuade courts to overturn arguably excessive
jury verdicts furnished support for adoption of the punitive damage concept. See Ash v.
Ash, 90 Eng. Rep. 526 (K.B. 1701) (court set aside a daughter's 2000 pound judgment
against her mother because the "jury were very shy of giving a reason of their verdict");
Wood v. Gunston, 82 Eng. Rep. 867 (Banc. Sup. 1655)(the "Supreme Bench," which had
replaced the King's Bench during the Interregnum, agreed that the court could overturn an
excessive jury verdict in a slander suit and ordered a new trial); Hawkins v. Sciet, 81 Eng.
Rep. 1099 (K.B. 1622)(first case to implicitly recognize the courts' power to set aside jury
verdicts, although court allowed instant verdict to stand); see also Ellis, supra, at 12-15.
Contra, Townsend v. Hughes, 86 Eng. Rep. 994 (C.P. 1649)(court held that it could not
interfere with the jury's power to determine damage awards and sustained plaintiff's judg-
ment of 4000 pounds).
11. K. REDDEN, supra note 1, § 2.2(A)(2).
12. Appellate courts in medieval England generally could not review a jury award of
damages. Instead, a litigant oppressed by an allegedly excessive award of damages could
pursue his grievance directly against the jury by means of a writ of attaint. If the court
determined the damages excessive pursuant to its writ, the jury members were punishable
1120
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sessed a proper, albeit punitive quality, simply served to justify
these purportedly excessive jury awards.
This attitude first may have manifested itself in American le-
gal jurisprudence in Earl v. Tupper,1 3 an early Vermont case in
which the court announced that it would not grant a new trial for
reason of excessive damage awards if the defendant's malice, op-
pression, or gross fraud contributed to the plaintiff's injury.14 As
the jury system continued its evolution and juries began to base
their verdicts on the testimony of others, however, courts began
exercising more control over the monetary amount of jury
awards."5 Consequently, jury determinations alone as justification
for tolerating punitive damages as an integral element of the rem-
edy in a tort reparations system began losing much, if not all, of
their significance.16
Another theory espoused to justify the use of punitive dam-
ages views punitory damages as compensation for plaintiffs' ethe-
real injuries such as hurt feelings, humiliation, wounded dignity,
mental anguish, and embarrassment, which the courts during the
formative stages of the common law were reluctant to recognize as
compensable injuries.17 Punitive damages, therefore, performed the
task of compensating plaintiffs for elements of personal harm that
otherwise were unrecoverable.18 In the early New Hampshire case
under its provisions. Sales, supra note 2, at 354. Such punishment could be so severe that
the jurors should "'become forever infamous; should forfeit their goods and the profits of
their land; should themselves be imprisoned, and their wives and children thrown out of
doors; should have their houses razed, their trees extirpated, and their meadows ploughed
. . .' K. REDDEN, supra note 1, § 2.2(A)(2) (quoting 3 BLACKSTONE, CoMmrWAMEs ON THE
LAWS OF ENGLAND 402 (1836)).
13. 45 Vt. 275 (1873).
14. Id. at 286.
15. K. REDDEN, supra note 1, § 2.2(A)(2).
16. See Note, Exemplary Damages in the Law of Torts, 70 HAnv. L. REv. 517, 530-33
(1957). Professor Ellis indicates that appellate courts today are more willing to use remitti-
tur to reduce excessive punitive damage awards. Iowa may be the only state that does not
allow remittitur of such verdicts. The availability of remittitur in other states does not lead
to any more certainty or consistency in punitive damage theory, however; increased availa-
bility just makes it more probable that state courts will refuse to uphold extremely large
awards. Ellis, supra note 10, at 55 (citing K. REDDEN, supra note 1, § 10.5).
17. J. GH IRDI & J. KmcumR, supra note 9, § 1.02 4; K. REDDEN, supra note 1, § 2.2(C);
Duffy, supra note 9, at 5; Sales, supra note 2, at 354.
18. Sales, supra note 2, at 354 (citing Stuart v. Western Union TeL Co., 66 Tex. 580,
18 S.W. 351 (1885)). The Texas Supreme Court in Stuart allowed recovery for mental
anguish when the defendant failed to deliver a death message. The court stated that "the
whole doctrine of punitory or exemplary damages has its foundation in a failure to recognize
as elements upon which compensation may be given, many things which ought to be classed
as injuries entitling the injured person to compensation." Stuart, 66 Tex. at 586, 18 S.W. at
1984] 1121
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of Fay v. Parker,19 the court discussed Huckle v. Money20 and
stated that the English decision "said no more, in substance, than
that for the outrage and indignity heaped upon the plaintiff by the
insolence, oppression, and tyranny of the defendant, a jury might
give the plaintiff liberal damages."2 1 Likewise, other early English
courts allowed intangible injuries to serve as the basis for punitive
damage awards. In Merest v. Harvey,22 plaintiff instituted a tres-
pass action because defendant intruded on plaintiff's land, fired
several times at game, and used extremely intemperate language.
The appellate court upheld a jury verdict of 500 pounds and
queried,
[I]n a case where a man disregards every principle which actuates the con-
duct of a gentleman, what is to restrain him except damages? To be sure, one
can hardly conceive worse conduct than this. What would be said to a person
in a low situation in life, who should behave himself in this manner?
13
The English court then refused to establish a principle that juries
justifiably could award only "the absolute pecuniary damage that
the plaintiff may sustain. '24 Similarly, the court in Tullidge v.
Wade 2 5 emphasized offensive behavior while discussing guidelines
for awarding damages. The Tullidge court stated, "In actions [in-
volving seduction] . .. the circumstances of time and place, when
and where the insult is given, require different damages; as it is a
greater insult to be beaten upon the Royal Exchange than in a pri-
vate room.""e
The ambit of compensatory damages has expanded rapidly
over recent years to include an entire spectrum of actual and ethe-
real injuries, including mental anguish, physical pain, loss of soci-
ety, loss of consortium, emotional trauma, and other metaphysical
injuries.27 The legal rationale that punitive damages serve a com-
pensatory function, therefore, has ceased to exist. Critics argue
that the lack of a viable compensatory rationale makes punitive
damages an anachronism that is no longer necessary or justifia-
353.
19. 53 N.H. 342 (1873).
20. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
21. Fay v. Parker, 53 N.H. at 364.
22. 128 Eng. Rep. 761 (C.P. 1814).
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. 95 Eng. Rep. 909 (C.P. 1769).
26. Id. at 910.
27. See K. REDDEN, supra note 1, § 7.5(D). "The availability of actual damages in tort
for mental anguish, wounded feelings, indignity and embarrassment have made the award-
ing of exemplary damages on such bases redundant." Id. § 2.3(A).
[Vol. 37:11171122
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ble.2 8 As the court forcefully stated in Fay v. Parker,29 the idea of
punitive damages "is wrong,... is a monstrous heresy," and "is
an unsightly and unhealthy excrescence, deforming the symmetry
and body of the law."30 At a minimum, and contrary to the philo-
sophical theorem of civil tort reparations, this doctrine reflects a
discomforting antibusiness bias.
A final justification urged in support of the punitive damage
concept is that quasi-criminal fines satisfy a void allegedly created
by the inequitable chasm between severe criminal penalties for
wrongs concerning property losses and, in too many instances,
lesser criminal penalties for more severe invasions of personal
rights. 1 Civil courts, therefore, allegedly can utilize punitive dam-
ages to punish more severely the egregious torts that cause per-
sonal harm,32 and a number of courts have expressed the rationale
that citizens are more likely to institute suits to protect their rights
and enforce the civil law if punitive damages provide an economic
incentive to litigate.33 Once again, however, because the concept of
compensatory damages currently embraces every conceivable ele-
ment of tangible and intangible injury,34 essentially unlimited com-
pensatory damages serve as a more than adequate economic incen-
tive for initiating civil litigation. By purpose and definition, the
civil law historically has evolved to compensate and not to pun-
ish 3 5 and in today's tort reparations system, compensatory dam-
28. Id. § 7.5(D); Coccia & Morrissey, Punitive Damages in Products Liability Cases
Should Not Be Allowed, 22 TRIAL LAW. GuIDE 46, 64-65 (1978); see infra notes 153-66 and
accompanying text.
29. 53 N.H. 342 (1873).
30. Id. at 382.
31. K. REDDEN, supra note 1, § 2.2(E) (citing Freifield, The Rationale of Punitive
Damages, 1 OHIO ST. L.J. 5, 9 (1935)); Sales, supra note 2, at 355.
32. K. REDDEN, supra note 1, § 2.2(E); Sales, supra note 2, at 355.
33. Special Project, supra note 2, at 694.
34. See Duffy, supra note 8, at 5; supra note 27 and accompanying text.
35. Defense Research Institute: The Case Against Punitive Damages, 6-7 (D. Hirsch
& J. Pouros eds. 1969); K. REDDEN, supra note 1, § 7.5(B). Dean Prosser stated:
A crime is an offense against the public at large, for which the state, as the representa-
tive of the public, will bring proceedings in the form of a criminal prosecution. The
purpose of such a proceeding is to protect and vindicate the interests of the public as a
whole, by punishing the offender or eliminating him from society, either permanently
or for a limited time, by reforming him or teaching him not to repeat the offense, and
by deterring others from imitating him ....
The civil action for tort, on the other hand, is commenced and maintained by the
injured person himself, and its purpose is to compensate him for the damage he has
suffered, at the expense of the wrongdoer.
W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 2, at 7 (4th ed. 1971) (footnote omitted).
Professors Lafave and Scott have observed:
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ages more than adequately fulfill this mission of total and com-
plete reparations. This last justification for the punitive damage
concept within the tort reparations system, therefore, not only is
suspect, but more importantly, is inherently flawed.
B. Status of Punitive Damages Today
The first American enunciation of the theory of punitive dam-
ages occurred in 1791 when a New Jersey court charged the jury in
Coryell v. Colbaugh"8 that "they were not to estimate the damages
by any particular proof of suffering or actual loss" but, instead,
should "give damages for example's sake, to prevent such offenses
in future. 's7 The Coryell court also stated that the damages should
be "such a sum as would mark their disapprobation, and be an
example to others."3 8 Despite this clear characterization of the pur-
pose of the punitive damages as deterrence, some historical confu-
sion existed concerning the ultimate reasoning that lay at the root
of punitive awards.39 Whatever justification may be advanced to
support the punitive damage concept, however, most commenta-
tors today acknowledge that the modern bases undergirding the
theory in the United States are punishment and deterrence.40 The
status of the punitive damage doctrine in today's tort environment,
however, remains remarkably unsettled. Jurisdictions disagree over
the applicability of punitive damages in civil actions, and even
those states embracing the punitive damages concept differ as to
application.41
The majority of jurisdictions endorse punitive damages as a
Criminal law and the law of torts.. . are related branches of the law; yet in a sense
they are two quite different matters. The aim of the criminal law.. . is to protect the
public against harm, by punishing harmful results of conduct or at least situations...
which are likely to result in harm if allowed to proceed further. The function of tort
law is to compensate someone who is injured for the harm he has suffered.
W. LAFAvE & A. Scorr, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW § 3, at 11 (1972).
36. 1 N.J.L. 77 (1791).
37. Id. at 77 (emphasis in original).
38. Id. at 78.
39. See K. REDDEN, supra note 1, § 2.3(B).
40. Id. § 2.3(A); Ellis, supra note 10, at 11-12; Sales, supra note 2, at 355. Some disa-
greement, however, exists over whether the modern justification for punitive damages in
England is compensation or punishment and deterrence. Compare Duffy, supra note 9, at 5
(citing Walther & Plein, Punitive Damages: A Critical Analysis: Kirk v. Combs, 49 MARQ.
L. REv. 369, 371 (1965))(theory that punitive damages are "compensation" for incompen-
sable injuries has remained the modem English justification) with J. GmHARDi & J. KIRCHE,
supra note 9, § 1.03, at 7 (citing Rookes v. Barnard, [1964] 1 All E.R. 367, 407)(despite early
confusion, current purpose of punitive damages in English law is "to punish and deter").
41. J. GHIARDI & J. KmcHER, supra note 9, § 4.01-.16; Sales, supra note 2, at 363.
1124 [Vol. 37:1117
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component of the common law.42 A minority of jurisdictions, nev-
ertheless, prohibit the recovery of punitive damages under the
common law.' Two of these jurisdictions allow punitive damages
only in the narrow context of statutorily authorized situations." At
least three jurisdictions either totally or partially proscribe the use
of punitive damages in all civil cases. 45 Additionally, four jurisdic-
tions, despite judicial declarations that punitive damages consti-
tute an integral part of the common law, so severely limit the scope
and application of the doctrine that, in essence, punitive damages
have been reduced to nothing more than compensatory damages.'6
42. See J. GHIURDI & J. KmCHER, supra note 9, at table 4.1 (46 states and the District
of Columbia allow punitive damages at common law); Duffy, supra note 9, at 6.
43. Louisiana, Massachusetts, Nebraska, and Washington constitute this minority.
See, e.g., McCoy v. Arkansas Natural Gas Co., 175 La. 487, 143 So. 383 (1932); City of
Lowell v. Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co., 313 Mass. 257, 47 N.E.2d 265 (1943); Abel v.
Conover, 170 Neb. 926, 104 N.W.2d 684 (1960); Kammerer v. Western Gear Corp., 96 Wash.
2d 416, 635 P.2d 708 (1981).
44. These jurisdictions are Louisiana and Massachusetts. No authority exists in Loui-
siana law for imposing punitive damages in any case "unless it be for some particular wrong
for which a statute expressly authorizes the imposition of some such penalty." McCoy v.
Arkansas Natural Gas Co., 175 La. at 497, 143 So. at 386; see Killebrew v. Abbott Laborato-
ries, 359 So. 2d 1275 (La. 1978). Massachusetts similarly disallows punitive damages in the
absence of specific statutory authorization. City of Lowell v. Massachusetts Bonding & Ins.
Co., 313 Mass. at 269-70, 47 N.E.2d at 272; see Caperci v. Huntoon, 397 F.2d 799, 801 (1st
Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 940 (1968). Statutorily allowed punitive damages in Massachu-
setts include situations in which the defendant is guilty of unfair or deceptive insurance
trade practices, MAsS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 176D, § 7 (West Supp. 1983-1984)(up to 25% of
underlying claim), and illegal willful dissemination of the criminal record of an offender,
MAss. GEN. LAws. ANN. ch. 6, § 177 (West 1976)(minimum $100 to maximum $1000); see
Barr v. Interbay Citizens Bank, 96 Wash. 2d. 409, 635 P.2d 441 (1981)(punitive damages
allowed only under express statutory authorization).
45. These jurisdictions include Indiana, Nebraska, and Washington. See, e.g., Gliss-
man v. Rutt, 175 Ind. App. 493, 494, 372 N.E.2d 1188, 1189 (1978)(criminal prosecution bars
imposition of punitive damages); Abel v. Conover, 170 Neb. 926, 929, 104 N.W.2d 684, 688
(1960)(court stated unequivocally that "punitive, vindictive, or exemplary damages will not
be allowed, and that the measure of recovery in all civil cases is compensation for the injury
sustained"); Spokane Truck & Dray Co. v. Hoefer, 2 Wash. 45, 53, 25 P. 1072, 1074
(1891)(Washington will allow only compensatory damages because they now cover all possi-
ble injuries and to allow punitive damages in addition would be akin to "exacting the pound
of flesh"); accord Kammerer v. Western Gear Corp., 96 Wash. 2d 416, 635 P.2d 708 (1981);
Barr v. Interbay Citizens Bank, 96 Wash. 2d. 409, 635 P.2d 441 (1981).
46. These states are Connecticut, Georgia, Michigan, and New Hampshire. See, e.g.,
Collens v. New Canaan Water Co., 155 Conn. 477, 488-89, 234 A.2d 825, 831-32 (1967)(puni-
tive damages actually have a compensatory nature and may not exceed the amount of plain-
tiff's expenses of litigation, less taxable costs); Westview Cemetery, Inc. v. Blanchard, 234
Ga. 540, 543-46, 216 S.E.2d 776, 778-81 (1975)(recovery under § 105-2003 for injury "to the
peace, happiness, or feelings of the plaintiff" may include punitive damages and, therefore,
precludes the recovery of punitive damages under § 105-2002); Wise v. Daniel, 221 Mich.
229, 233-34, 190 N.W. 746, 747 (1922)(factfinder may not award exemplary damages as a
separate amount for example or punishment, although compensatory damages may be in-
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37:1117
III. BASIS FOR APPLYING THE PUNITIVE DAMAGE DOCTRINE
The generally accepted bases for punitive damages in those ju-
risdictions that have adopted the concept are punishment and de-
terrence.47 Some jurisdictions adopt only one or the other of these
rationales, while others adopt the dual rationales. Some jurisdic-
tions still view punitive damages as an additional award to allowa-
ble compensatory sums-to compensate for perceived gaps in repa-
rations, as was practiced during the colonial era.
A. Punishment and Deterrence
The great majority of jurisdictions that currently authorize the
recovery of noncompensatory, punitive damages adopt the dual ra-
tionales of punishment and deterrence as justification for their po-
sition.48 One commentator offered seven legal theories in support
of the punitive damage concept.49 He acknowledged, however, that
any legal doctrine that is predicated on such a disparate variety of
grounds "may reasonably be suspected of resting on no very firm
basis in policy."' 0 Consequently, he reduced these seven rationale
to two fundamental tenets: wrong-doers deserve punishment be-
yond that which compensatory damages provide, and the judicial
system needs punitive damages to deter socially harmful, loss cre-
ating conduct by defendants. 51 A number of recent cases echo
these incantations to justify the use of punitive measures."2
creased); Vratsenes v. New Hampshire Auto, Inc., 112 N.H. 71, 73, 289 A.2d 66, 68
(1972)(punitive award not allowable, but compensatory damages may be increased to com-
pensate plaintiff in cases of wanton, malicious, or oppressive conduct).
47. See supra note 40 and accompanying text. The states that recognize punishment
and deterrence as the rationales for punitive damages obviously do not include the four
states that employ the punitive nomenclature in designating essentially compensatory
awards. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
48. J. GHARDI & J. KmCHER, supra note 9, § 4.14 & n.1 (citing cases and statutes from
36 states and the District of Columbia).
49. Ellis, supra note 10, at 3. Professor Ellis offered as possible justifications: (1) pun-
ishment of the defendant; (2) specific deterrence of the defendant; (3) general deterrence of
others from acting in a similar manner; (4) preservation of the peace; (5) inducement of
private law enforcement; (6) compensation of victims for otherwise uncompensable losses;
and (7) payment of plaintiffs' attorneys' fees. Id.
50. Id. at 3 n.10 (quoting T. BATY, VicAmous LIALmrry 148 (1916)).
51. Ellis, supra note 10, at 11.
52. See, e.g., Moran v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 691 F.2d 811, 815 (6th Cir.
1982)(failure to warn would support punitive award if such failure manifested a flagrant
indifference to the risk of harm); Neal v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 21 Cal. 3d 910, 928 n.13, 582
P.2d 980, 990 n.13, 148 Cal. Rptr. 389, 399 n.13 (1978)("purpose of punitive damages is to
punish wrongdoers and thereby deter commission of wrongful acts"); Gryc v. Dayton-Hud-
son Corp., 297 N.W.2d 727, 741 (Minn.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 921 (1980)(court allowed
1126
1984] PUNITIVE DAMAGES 1127
Courts generally are quick to assert that they fully control the
extent of punishment meted out by punitive damages." An excep-
tion to this rule, and one that has created much controversy be-
cause of the absence of any responsible theoretical foundations
coupled with its fundamental inequities," is the award of punitive
damages based on vicarious liability.
5
Courts are less than clear in defining and identifying the enti-
ties sought to be deterred by the effects of punitive damages." For
example, Iowa, Mississippi, North Carolina, Ohio, Texas, Virginia,
and West Virginia intend to deter persons other than the defen-
dant from committing acts similar to those that prompted the pu-
nitive damage award.57 Other jurisdictions that have adopted puni-
tive damages observe that it is their policy to deter both the
defendant and other potential wrongdoers. 58 Arizona and New
Jersey, however, hold that the deterrent effect of punitive damages
should be directed only at the particular tortfeasor before the
court,59 while Minnesota is unclear concerning whom it intends to
punitive damages, even though manufacturer had ceased production of dangerous product,
for purpose of deterring future misconduct and "to punish past misconduct"); Leingruber
v. Claridge Assocs., 73 N.J. 450, 454, 375 A.2d 652, 654 (1977)(theory of punitive damages is
to punish the defendant for aggravated misconduct and deter such conduct in the future);
Sandier v. Lawn-A-Mat Chem. & Equip. Corp., 141 N.J. Super. 436, 448, 358 A.2d 805, 811
(1976)(punitive damages are intended to punish the tortfeasor and prevent him from re-
peating such misconduct).
53. J. GHIARDI & J. KmcHER, supra note 9, § 5.39.
54. See infra notes 101-07 & 188-201 and accompanying text.
55. J. GmIARD1 & J. KmCHER, supra note 9, § 4.14.
56. Id.
57. See, e.g., Pringle Tax Serv., Inc. v. Knoblauch, 282 N.W.2d 151, 154 (Iowa 1979);
Standard Life Ins. Co. v. Veal, 354 So. 2d 239, 247 (Miss. 1977); Newton V. Standard Fire
Ins. Co., 291 N.C. 105, 114, 229 S.E.2d 297, 302 (1976); Detling v. Chockley, 70 Ohio St. 2d
134, 136, 436 N.E.2d 208, 209 (1982); City Nat'l. Bank v. Haynes, 614 S.W.2d 605, 609 (Tex.
1981); FBC Stores, Inc., v. Duncan, 214 Va. 246, 251, 198 S.E.2d 595, 599 (1973); Spencer v.
Steinbrecher, 152 W. Va. 490, 500, 164, S.E.2d 710, 717 (1968). North Carolina consistently
has allowed punitive damages solely on the basis of its policy to punish intentional wrongdo-
ing and to deter others from similar behavior. See, e.g., Newton v. Standard Fire Ins. Co.,
291 N.C. 105 at 114, 229 S.E.2d 297, 302 (1976).
58. See, e.g., Kerr v. First Commodity Corp. of Boston, 735 F.2d 281, 289 (5th Cir.
1984)(applying Missouri law); Ray Dodge, Inc. v. Moore, 251 Ark. 1036, 1044, 479 S.W.2d
518, 523 (1972); Frick v. Abell, 198 Colo. 508, 511, 602 P.2d 852, 853 (Colo. 1979); Gent v.
Collinsville Volkswagen, Inc., 116 Ill. App. 3d 496, -, 451 N.E.2d 1385, 1391 (1983); Tay-
lor v. Wachter, 227 Kan. 221, 224, 607 P.2d 1094, 1098 (1980); Bisset v. Goss, 481 S.W.2d 71,
74 (Ky. 1972); Wedeman v. City Chevrolet Co., 278 Md. 524, 531, 366 A.2d 7, 12 (1976);
Miller v. Watkins, 653 P.2d 126, 133 (Mont. 1982); Fahrenberg v. Tengel, 96 Wis. 2d 211,
222, 291 N.W.2d 516 (1980).
59. See, e.g., Acheson v. Shafter, 107 Ariz. 576, 578, 490 P.2d 832, 834 (1971)(punitive
damages are meant to punish the wrongdoer and to act as a deterrent to further wrongdo-
ing); Sandler v. Lawn-A-Mat Chem. & Equip. Co., 141 N.J. Super. 436, 448, 358 A.2d 805,
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deter with punitive damages."0
B. Punishment Only
Delaware is the only state that has adopted punishment as the
sole purpose for the imposition of punitive damages. 1 The Dela-
ware Supreme Court has stated that it will allow punitive damages
only as punishment to the tortfeasor for willfully and wantonly
committed wrongful acts.2 Wisconsin, similarly, recognizes the
punishment rationale as a sufficient, if not sole, basis for imposing
punitive damages.63
C. Deterrence Only
Deterrence represents the singular basis for authorizing puni-
tive damages in Alaska, Georgia, Idaho, Maine, Oregon, Rhode Is-
land, and Utah.6 4 Many of these jurisdictions, however, do not spe-
cifically hold deterrence as the sole rationale for awarding punitive
damages, but merely imply this basis.6 5 The Idaho Supreme Court,
in discussing the policy of deterrence, observed:
We prefer to accentuate those cases which define the purpose of exemplary
damages as a deterrent to the defendant and others from engaging in similar
conduct in the future. We concede that any exemplary damages assessed
against a defendant will appear to him to be punishment. However, we feel
811 (1976)(punitive damages "are intended to punish the tortfeasor and prevent him from
repeating such conduct").
60. See, e.g., Jensen v. Peterson, 264 N.W.2d 139, 144 (Minn. 1978)(punitive damages
deter particularly egregious conduct, but court does not indicate by whom); Kirchbaum v.
Lowrey, 165 Minn. 233, 236, 206 N.W. 171, 173 (1925)(punitive damages deter willful, wan-
ton, or malicious wrongs, but court does not specify by whom).
61. See Malcom v. Little, 295 A.2d 711, 714 (Del. 1972); Riegel v. Aastad, 272 A.2d
715, 718 (Del. 1970).
62. Malcom v. Little, 295 A.2d at 714 (Del. 1972); Riegel v. Aastad, 272 A.2d at 718
(Del. 1970).
63. See Hofer v. Lavender, No. C-2552 (Tex. July 11, 1984) (either deterrence or pun-
ishment, or both are now recognized as valid). Compare Wussow v. Commercial Mecha-
nisms, Inc., 97 Wis. 2d 136, 155-56, 293 N.W.2d 897, 907 (1980)(punishment of past conduct
is a sufficient basis for assessing punitive damages, even though they can also serve to deter
future outrageous conduct) with John Mohr & Sons v. Jahnke, 55 Wis. 2d 402, 411, 198
N.W.2d 363, 368 (1972)(punitive damages act to punish and deter).
64. J. GmAR)i & J. KmcHEa, supra note 9, § 4.15 at 17.
65. Maine, Oregon, and Utah are among those states that specifically state that deter-
rence is the only proper basis of punitive damages. See, e.g., Foss v. Maine Turnpike Auth.,
309 A.2d 339, 345 (Me. 1973)(deterrence is the proper justification for exemplary damages);
Lewis v. Devils Lake Rock Crushing Co., 274 Or. 293, 300, 545 P.2d 1374, 1378 (1976)(deter-
rence is only proper basis for imposing punitive damages); Nash v. Craigco, Inc., 585 P.2d
775, 778 (Utah 1978)(punitive damages teach the defendant not to repeat and warn others
not to participate in such conduct).
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that the courts in these civil cases should be motivated primarily by a pur-
pose of deterrence and not by a purpose of punishment. In other words, the
assessment of exemplary damages should be prompted by the court's or jury's
desire to assure, to the extent possible via the imposition of a monetary pen-
alty, that similar conduct does not occur in the future. Punishment, per se,
should be left to the criminal law."
Also, as in those jurisdictions that recognize both punishment and
deterrence as the rationales for punitive damages, 67 the jurisdic-
tions that recognize only a deterrence rationale fail to clarify the
entities sought to be deterred by the award of punitive damages."
This lack of uniformity in policy and application reflects the inher-
ent weakness in a doctrine that, rather than advancing the best
interests of society, actually threatens society's economic
underpinnings.
Texas recently has announced that either deterrence or pun-
ishment, separately and independently, constitute an appropriate
rationale for the assessment of punitive damages." Therefore, the
plaintiff may elect to seek punitive damages based on only the de-
terrence rationale, on only the punishment rationale, or both.70
This judicial aberration reflects not only the lack of legal sound-
ness of the doctrine, but also demonstrates the court's acceptance
of the notion that punitive damages can serve as a windfall for
plaintiffs.
D. Award of Additional Damages
Several jurisdictions view punitive damages as mere monetary
awards that complement compensatory damages.7 1 Punitive dam-
66. Jolley v. Puregro Co., 94 Idaho 702, 708-09, 496 P.2d 939, 945-46 (1972).
67. See supra notes 56-60 and accompanying text. At least one jurisdiction, California,
has suggested that punitive damages may be levied against a product supplier to deter the
entire industry of which the defendant is a member. See Schleininger v. Questor Corp., 200
Cal. Rptr. 634 (1984). The extra penalty of monetary awards based on alleged wanton and
reckless conduct by all members of an industry is an unwarranted extension of an already
flawed concept.
68. See J. GHLARDI & J.KIRCHER, supra note 9, § 4.15, at 18.
69. Hofer v. Lavender No. C-2552 (Tex. July 11, 1984).
70. In a strongly worded dissent Justice Spears noted that
[t]he punitive and deterrant aims of exemplary damages are not separable. The general
deterrent effect of an award can not be considered in isolation, because to a large ex-
tent general deterrence depends on punishment. Specifically, members of the public
are deterred from similar misconduct because they witnessed the wrongdoers
conduct....
Id.
71. See Collens v. New Canaan Water Co., 155 Conn. 477, 234 A.2d 825 (1967); West-
view Cemetery, Inc. v. Blanchard, 234 Ga. 540, 216 S.E.2d 776 (1975); McLaren v. Zeilinger,
103 Mich. App. 22, 302 N.W.2d 583 (1981); Perry v. Melton, 299 S.E.2d 8 (W. Va. 1982).
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ages, in these jurisdictions, serve to provide remuneration for in-
tangible injuries such as hurt feelings, loss of companionship,
wounded dignity, grief, embarrassment, 2 mental anguish, 3 or liti-
gation expenses.74 These jurisdictions predicate their philosophy
on the outdated theorem that such injuries were not compensable
under early common law.7 5 Common sense and the current availa-
bility of expanded, if not unlimited, compensatory damages in all
tort actions expose the fallacy of this rationale.78
IV. APPLICATION OF THE PUNITiVE DAMAGE DOCTRINE IN TODAY'S
CONTEXT
A. Standards of Conduct That Warrant Punitive Damages
The ratio decidendi that courts employ when imposing puni-
tive damages vary in almost indecipherable, yet extremely impor-
tant, degrees. The disparate innuendos and connotations that ac-
company the legal bases articulated to support punitive damage
liability precipitate subtle shifts in jury interpretations, in under-
standings of the law, and in burdens of proof. For this reason, the
jurisdiction in which a plaintiff institutes suit profoundly affects
the outcome of his case. Generally, most jurisdictions focus on the
defendant's conduct, rather than the nature or extent of the harm
sustained by the plaintiff.77 This restricted approach lends itself to
anything but consistency. Although a broad standard is necessarily
imprecise, most commentators acknowledge that the imposition of
punitive damages requires more than a mere tbrtious act-the de-
fendant's conduct must be aggravated or outrageous, or character-
ized by some positive element of conscious wrongdoing.
78
But, as noted in Ratner v. Sioux Natural Gas Corp., 719 F.2d 801,804 (5th Cir. 1983), "[t]he
award of punitive damages is unconcerned with compensation; it is intended to punish the
wrongdoer and deter the commission of similar offenses in the future."
72. Sales, supra note 2, at 354; see Hink v. Sherman, 164 Mich. 352, 357, 129 N.W.
732, 734 (1911); Fay v. Parker, 53 N.H. 342, 380 (1873).
73. See Stuart v. Western Union Tel Co., 66 Tex. 530, 18 S.W. 351 (1885).
74. Duffy, supra note 9, at 11; see also Reinah Dev. Corp. v. Kaaterskill Hotel, 86
A.D.2d 50, 448 N.Y.S.2d 686 (1982), rev'd on other grounds, 465 N.Y.2d 482, 452 N.E.2d
1238 (1983).
75. See supra notes 17-29 and accompanying text.
76. See infra notes 213-20 and accompanying text.
77. See generally J. GHJARDI & J. KmcHER, supra note 9, § 5.01, at 2; Sales, supra
note 2, at 364-65; Special Project, supra note 2, at 695.
78. As an example, Dean Prosser has noted:
Something more than the mere commission of a tort is always required for punitive
damages. There must be circumstances of aggravation or outrage, such as spite or
"malice," or a fraudulent or evil motive on the part of the defendent, or such a con-
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1. Standard of Intentional Conduct
Those jurisdictions and commentators who recognize the va-
lidity of the punitive damage doctrine envision recovery when the
defendant's actions either are or are deemed to be intentional . 9
Most of these courts and commentators adopt this proposition
scious and deliberate disregard of the interests of others that his conduct may be called
willful or wanton. Lacking this element, there is general agreement that mere negli-
gence is not enough, even though it is so extreme in degree as to be characterized as
"gross," an unhappy term of ill-defined content, which occasionally, in a few jurisdic-
tions, has been stretched to include the element of conscious indifference to conse-
quences, and so to justify punitive damages. Still less, of course, can such damages be
charged against one who acts under an innocent mistake in engaging in conduct that
nevertheless constitutes a tort.
W. PROSSER, supra note 34, § 2, at 9-10. Similarly, Professor McCormick has suggested:
Since these damages are assessed for punishment and not for reparation, a positive
element of conscious wrongdoing is always required. It must be shown either that the
defendant was actuated by ill will, malice, or evil motive (which may appear by direct
evidence of such motive, or from the inherent character of the tort itself, or from the
oppressive character of his conduct, sometimes called "circumstances" of aggrava-
tion"), or by fraudulent purposes, or that he was so wanton and reckless, as to evince a
conscious disregard of the rights of others. "Gross negligence" is a somewhat ambigu-
ous expression. In the sense of extreme carelessness merely, it would probably not suf-
fice, but only when it goes further and amounts to conscious indifference to harmful
consequences.
McCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF DAMAGES § 79, at 280-82 (1935). For the sake of
simplicity, this Article adopts the broad terms of "intentional," "reckless," and "negligent"
to describe and refer to the standards of conduct that govern the imposition of punitive
damages. "Intentional" refers to that conduct which is characterized by willfulness or mal-
ice, whether express, implied in fact, or implied in law. "Reckless" refers to that conduct
which, although not intentional, is marked by various degrees of indifference or wantonness.
"Negligent" includes that nebulous area of careless action which courts generally have
viewed as insufficient for the imposition of punitive damages. The circular and overlapping
characteristics of these three categories reflect the ambiguity and lack of definition inherent
in the punitive damage environment. See Ellis, supra note 9, at 34-37, for another attempt
to deal with this confusion.
79. See generally J. GHIuRDi & J. KmcHER, supra note 9, § 5.02. (The authors give
numerous examples of the imposition of punitive damages for the intentional tort of assault
and battery.) Some state legislatures have dictated that punitive damages are permissible
for intentional or quasi-intentional conduct. See, e.g., MmN. STAT. ANN. § 549.20(1)(1984)
(requiring "clear and convincing evidence that the acts of the defendant show a willful indif-
ference to the rights or safety or others"); MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-221 (1983) (where the
defendant has been "guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice, actual or presumed"); NEv. REv.
STAT. § 42.010(1)(1981) (where the defendant has "been guilty of oppression, fraud or mal-
ice, express or implied"); N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03-07 (Supp. 1983) ("when the defendant
has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice, actual or presumed"); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
23, § 9 (1955) ("where the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud or malice, actual
or presumed"); S.D. CODiFED LAws ANN. § 21-3-2 (1979) ("where the defendant has been
guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice, actual or presumed"). One state legislature has man-
dated a reckless standard for awarding punitive damages. See COLO. REv. STAT. § 13-21-102
(1973) ("the injury complained of is attended by circumstances of fraud, malice or insult, or
a wanton and reckless disregard of the injured party's rights and feelings").
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without hesitation and endeavor to expand the punitive damage
concept to situations that concern more imprecise conduct.80 It is
in this area of marginally intentional conduct that the judicial
standards for imposing punitive damages first become muddled
and legally irrational. Some states, therefore, have espoused very
strong standards of appellate review. In Rhode Island the courts
will approve punitive awards only "upon evidence of such willful-
ness, recklessness or wickedness, on the part of the party at fault,
as amounted to criminality.""1 New Jersey, similarly, requires the
plaintiff to prove "actual malice, which is nothing more or less
than intentional wrongdoing-an evil-minded act.., or an act ac-
companied by a wanton and willful disregard of the rights of an-
other. '8 2 Other jurisdictions have couched the standard in slightly
different, yet equally strong, language. California requires that
"the defendant must be guilty of oppression, fraud or malice....
He must act with the intention to vex, injure or annoy, or with a
conscious disregard of the plaintiff's rights."' s In Vermont the
plaintiff must show "that there was actual malice . . . conduct
80. See Ellis, supra note 10, at 21-22 (when a defendant purposefully injures someone,
then characterization of that action as the commission of a wrongful act with a culpable
mental state that deserves punishment is relatively easy). The principal problems in justify-
ing punitive damages from a just desserts standpoint arise when the defendant's conduct
may not be characterized as purposeful harm. Much of the disagreement among the jurisdic-
tions centers on expanding the punitive damage concept to embrace merely reckless con-
duct. Id.; see also Addair v. Huffman, 195 S.E.2d 739, 744 (W. Va. 1973) (intentional disre-
gard of a law that protects the public from a particular abuse, thereby resulting in injury,
gives rise to the imposition of punitive damages).
81. Sherman v. McDermott, 114 R.I. 107, 109, 329 A.2d 195, 196 (1974)(quoting Ad-
ams v. Lorraine Mfg. Co., 29 R.I. 333, 338, 71 A. 180, 182 (1908)).
82. Sandler v. Lawn-A-Mat Chem. & Equip. Corp., 141 N.J. Super. 437, 448, 358 A.2d
805, 811 (1976)(quoting La Bruno v. Lawrence, 64 N.J. Super. 570, 575, 166 A.2d 822, 824
(1960), cert. denied, 34 N.J. 323, 168 A.2d 694 (1961); see Kocse v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co.,
152 N.J. Super. 371, 375-76, 377 A.2d 1234, 1236 (1977). Idaho applies a similar standard.
See Cheney v. Palos Verdes Inv. Corp., 104 Idaho 897, 905, 665 P.2d 661, 669 (1983); Lin-
scott v. Ranier Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 100 Idaho 854, 858, 606 P.2d 958, 962 (1980)(punitive
damages are appropriate if defendant's act is an "extreme deviation from reasonable stan-
dards of conduct" and if defendant acted "with an understanding of or a disregard for its
likely consequences"). Texas also arguably falls within this category. In Ogle v. Craig, 464
S.W.2d 95 (Tex. 1971), the Texas Supreme Court stated that the "act complained of not
only must be unlawful but also must partake of a wanton and malicious nature, or, as some-
times stated, somewhat of a criminal or wanton nature." Id. at 97 (quoting Dennis v. Dial
Fin. & Thrift Co., 401 S.W.2d 803, 805 (Tex. 1966)). Texas, however, also allows recovery of
punitive damages for grossly negligent conduct. See Schwartz v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 669
F.2d 1091, 1093 (5th Cir. 1982); Burk Royalty Co. v. Walls, 616 S.W.2d 911, 920 (Tex. 1981);
Houston Lighting & Power Co. v. Sue, 644 S.W.2d 835, 839 (Tex. Civ. App. 1982).
83. Silberg v. California Life Ins. Co., 11 Cal. 3d 452, 462, 521 P.2d 1103, 1110, 113
Cal. Rptr. 711, 718 (1974); see Colonial Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 31 Cal.
3d 785, 792, 647 P.2d 86, 90, 183 Cal. Rptr. 810, 814 (1982).
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manifesting personal ill will or carried out under circumstances ev-
idencing insult or oppression, or even by conduct showing a reck-
less or wanton disregard of one's rights."'" Other states employ
weaker characterizations of the intentional conduct standard. New
York requires that "the wrong [be] aggravated by evil or a wrong-
ful motive or that there [be] willful and intentional misdoing, or a
reckless indifference equivalent thereto."85 Alabama possesses one
84. Shortle v. Central Vt. Pub. Serv. Corp., 137 Vt. 32, 33, 399 A.2d 517, 518 (1979).
Other jurisdictions follow similar standards. See Freeman v. Anderson, 279 Ark. 282, 286-87,
651 S.W.2d 450, 452 (1983); Dalrymple v. Fields, 276 Ark. 185, 188, 633 S.W.2d 362, 363
(1982)(must be shown that "in the absence of proof of malice or willfulness there was a
wanton and conscious disregard for the rights and safety of others"); Satterfield v. Rebsa-
men Ford, Inc., 253 Ark. 181, 185, 485 S.W.2d 192, 195 (1972)("when the defendant acts
with malice ... or with willfulness, wantonness, or conscious indifference to consequences
from which malice may be inferred")(citations omitted); Sere v. Group Hospitalization, Inc.,
443 A.2d 33, 37 (D.C. 1982)("defendant's tortious conduct must have been outrageous, char-
acterized by malice, wantonness, gross fraud, recklessness, or willful disregard of the plain-
tiff's rights"); Riggs Nat'l Bank v. Price, 359 A.2d 25, 28 (D.C. 1976)("for outrageous con-
duct such as maliciousness, wantonness, gross fraud, recklessness and willful disregard of
another's rights"); Toyota Motor Co. v. Moll, 438 So. 2d 192 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983)("for
actions or inactions amounting to willfulness, wantonness, maliciousness, reciessness, op-
pression, or outrageous conduct"); Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 74 Ill. 2d 172, 186, 384 N.E.2d
353, 359 (1978)("committed with fraud, actual malice, deliberate violence or oppression, or
when the defendant acts willfully, or with such gross negligence as to indicate a wanton
disregard of the rights of others"); Gent v. Collinsville Volkswagen, Inc., 116 Ill. App. 3d
496, 451 N.E.2d 1385 (1983); General Motors Corp. v. Piskor, 277 Md. 165, 175, 352 A.2d
810, 817 (1976)("only when there is an element of fraud, malice, evil intent or oppression
which enters into and forms a part of the wrongful act"); Nelson v. Jacobsen, 669 P.2d 1207,
1219 (Utah 1983) (requiring a higher standard of proof than "willful and malicious" for puni-
tive awards in an alienation of affections case); Kesler v. Rogers, 542 P.2d 354, 359 (Utah
1974)("for particularly grievous injury caused by conduct which is not only wrongful, but
which is willful and malicious so that it seems to one's sense of justice that mere recompense
for actual loss is inadequate").
85. Jones v. Hospital for Joint Diseases and Medical Center, 96 A.D.2d 498, 499, 465
N.Y.S.2d 517, 517 (1982); see Le Mistral, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 61 A.D.2d 491,
494, 402 N.Y.S.2d 815, 817 (1978)("based upon tortious acts which involve ingredients of
malice, fraud, oppression, insult, wanton or reckless disregard of the plaintiff's rights, or
other circumstances of aggravation"). For other weak standard formulations, see Alyeska
Pipeline Serv. Co. v. O'Kelley, 645 P.2d 767, 774 (Alaska 1982)("characterized as outra-
geous, such as acts done with malice or bad motives or reckless indifference to the interests
of another")(quoting Bridges v. Alaska Hous. Auth., 375 P.2d 696, 702 (Alaska 1962));
Sturm, Ruger & Co. v. Day, 594 P.2d 38, 46 (Alaska 1979); Malcolm v. Little, 295 A.2d 711,
714 (Del. 1972)("when [the defendant's] wrongful act was committed willfully or wan-
tonly")(quoting Riegel v. Aastad, 272 A.2d 715, 718 (Del. 1970)); Meyer v. Nottger, 241
N.W.2d 911, 922 (Iowa 1976)("where defendant acts maliciously ... where the nature of
the illegal act is such as to negative any inference of feeling toward the person in-
jured") (quoting Amos v. Prom, 115 F. Supp. 127, 136-37 (N.D. Iowa 1953)); McKinnon v.
Tibbetts, 440 A.2d 1028, 1031 (Me. 1982)("malicious, gross or wanton"); Foss v. Main Turn-
pike Auth., 309 A.2d 339, 345 (Me. 1973)("the conduct of the defendant is found to be
deliberate, malicious or grossly negligent"); Addair v. Huffman, 156 W. Va. 592, 599, 195
S.E.2d 739, 743 (1973)("where there is an intentional wrong, or where there are circum-
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of the weaker intentional conduct standards in that the courts only
require "some circumstances of aggravation, such as willfulness,
wantonness, maliciousness, gross negligence or recklessness, op-
pression, outrageous conduct, indignity and contumely, insult, or
fraud or gross fraud.""6
The standards of intentional conduct sufficient to warrant pu-
nitive awards vary in degrees, both from each other and from the
reckless and negligent standards that many jurisdictions apply.
Significantly, one legal scholar has proposed that courts should
limit punitive damages to cases concerning intentional faults.8 7 An-
other well-known scholar, who formerly enthusiastically supported
a rather unrestricted approach to punitive damages,88 after viewing
the results of an unfettered application of punitive damages over a
mere seven year period, now recognizes the importance of limiting
punitive damages to intentional and quasi-intentional situations.8 9
stances which warrant an inference of malice, willfulness, or wanton disregard of the rights
of others"); Petsch v. Florom, 538 P.2d 1011, 1013 (Wyo. 1975)("the act of the defendant
was committed maliciously, willfully or wantonly").
86. Ex parte Smith, 412 So. 2d 1222, 1223 (Ala. 1982); see Ford Motor Credit Co. v.
Washington, 420 So. 2d 14 (Ala. 1982); Ex parte Lewis, 416 So. 2d 410 (Ala. 1982).
87. Cooter, supra note 9, at 80. Professor Cooter suggests that because most potential
wrongdoers find it economically cheaper to comply with the law, noncompliance is usually
unintentional. If the wrongdoer's actions are unintentional, then punitive damages are un-
necessary for deterrence and underserved for punishment. Professor Cooter, however, also
argues that some individuals intentionally cause harm, and that courts should impose puni-
tive damages against these purposeful wrongdoers to offset either their illicit pleasure in
noncompliance or the exceptional cost of compliance that instigates their noncompliance.
Id. at 79-80. If, however, such deterrent or punitory measures are still necessary in light of
the present expanded compensatory damage remedy, those effects should be achieved
through the criminal processes, or at a minimum, restructured to preclude a windfall to an
already fully compensated plaintiff.
88. See Owen, Punitive Damages in Product Liability Litigation, 74 MjcH. L. REv.
1258 (1976).
89. Owen, supra note 9, at 106-07. Professor Owen asserts that the assessment of pu-
nitive damages in "deliberate" situations-those concerning conduct intended to cause
harm for no good reason--"generally would be regarded as appropriate without much argu-
ment about either fairness or efficiency." Accordingly, punitive damages properly would lie
in "evaluative" situations-those in which the defendant evaluates the circumstances and
decides that he will benefit enough from the act to justify its occurrence-but only if the
defendant's choice is wrong (immoral) and the defendant knows or recklessly fails to dis-
cover its wrongfulness before acting. Professor Owen, however, now draws the line at "inad-
vertent" acts-those that show no real thought by the defendant concerning the wrongful-
ness or implications of the act-because a failure to think usually does not call for
punishment. Id. This shift is understandable because an objective view of the courts' indis-




2. Standard of Reckless Conduct
The broad area of reckless or wanton conduct is an ill-defined,
often fluctuating category. The courts ostensibly have articulated a
clearly defined and legally meaningful standard to evaluate poten-
tial liability for punitive damages. Any analysis of the cases, how-
ever, reveals an unintelligible, linguistic exercise in legalese, the
significance of which doubtlessly is lost upon many legal scholars
and, more importantly, most jurors. Generally, the cases delineate
a continuum of antisocial conduct. The upper, aggravated end of
this continuum approaches intentional conduct, and therefore,
courts are more likely to authorize the imposition of punitive dam-
ages for this type of conduct. The lower, more passive end of the
continuum consists of conduct that is simply improper or ill-con-
ceived, but is not of such egregious quality that it warrants puni-
tory measures. Between these two extremes is conduct that varies
in often imperceptible, but extremely important degrees for the
application of the punitive damage concept.
A review of the cases employing "the reckless or wanton" stan-
dard discloses a disturbing overlap between this standard and the
intentional conduct standard. The distinctions between the two
standards often are too imperceptible to allow absolute categoriza-
tion. Some courts proclaim that the standard for the imposition of
punitive damages is "actual malice, which is nothing more or less
than intentional wrongdoing-an evil-minded act"' 0, or "an evil in-
tent deserving of punishment or of something in the nature of spe-
cial ill will." 91 Some courts repudiate the necessity of demonstrat-
ing actual malice in favor or a standard of "legal malice," which
90. Sandier v. Lawn-A-Mat Chem. & Equip. Co., 141 N.J. Super. 437, 448, 358 A.2d
805, 811 (1976). The court also refers to conduct that evinces a "wanton and willful disre-
gard of the rights of another." Id. Actual malice, likewise, reflects the Iowa and Maryland
standards. See Feeney v. Scott County, 290 N.W.2d 885, 892 (Iowa 1980); see also West Des
Moines State Bank v. Hawkeye Bancorp., 722 F.2d 411, 414 (8th Cir.. 1983); Savol v. BL
Ltd., 710 F.2d 1027, 1033 (4th Cir. 1983). South Carolina and Virginia also use similar for-
mulations. See King v. Allstate Ins. Co., 272 S.C. 259, 263, 251 S.E.2d 194, 196 (1979)("must
be malice, ill will, a conscious indifference to the rights of others, or a reckless disregard
thereof")(quoting Cox v. Coleman, 189 S.C. 218, 221, 200 S.E. 762, 764 (1939)); Peacock
Buick, Inc. v. Durkin, 221 Va. 1133, 1136-37, 277 S.E.2d 225, 227 (1981)(actual malice or
malice in fact); Jordan v. Sauve, 219 Va. 448, 452, 247 S.E.2d 739, 741 (1978)("only where
there is misconduct or actual malice").
91. Anderson v. Continental Ins. Co., 85 Wis. 2d 675, 697, 271 N.W.2d 368, 379 (1978);
see Franklin Music Co. v. American Broadcasting Co., 616 F.2d 528, 542 (3d Cir.
1979)(Pennsylvania law requires bad motive or reckless indifference); Amish v. Walnut
Creek Dev., Inc., 631 S.W.2d 866, 876 (Mo. App. 1982)(bad motive or evil intent).
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appears to differ little from intentional conduct.92 Others refer to
"conscious disregard of [the plaintiff's] rights" and award punitive
damages when the evidence demonstrates that the defendant acted
willfull and maliciously.9 s Other courts denominate reckless or
wanton conduct as "gross negligence" which then is defined as an
"entire want of care" that raises an inference of "conscious indif-
ference" to the rights of others. 4 Still other jurisdictions judge the
defendant's conduct against a standard of reckless or wanton con-
duct, oppression, fraud, or malice under which the wrongdoer must
act with the intent to vex, injure or annoy, 5 or act out of a mali-
ciousness or recklessness that evidences an utter disregard of the
consequences. 6 At least one court has judicially formulated a stan-
dard of reckless, wanton, or oppressive conduct that requires spite,
ill will, or reckless indifference by the defendant. 7 Tennessee has
92. Under Missouri law, legal malice and not actual malice governs an award for puni-
tive damages. Armstrong v. Republic Realty Mortgage Corp., 631 F.2d 1344, 1352 (8th Cir.
1980)(applying Missouri law); Pollock v. Brown, 569 S.W.2d 724, 732 (Mo. 1978). As noted
by the court in Crues v. KFC Corp., 729 F.2d 1145, 1153 (8th Cir. 1984)(citing Beggs v.
Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 409 S.W.2d 719 (Mo. 1966)), legal malice is defined to mean
"whether the defendant did a wrongful act intentionally and without just cause or excuse
... [meaning] that defendant not only intended to do the act which is ascertained to be
wrongful but that he knew it was wrongful when he did it." Accord Pollock v. Brown, 569
S.W.2d at 724.
93. Gulf Atl. Life Ins. Co. v. Barnes, 405 So. 2d 916 (Ala. 1981); Randall v. Ganz, 96
Idaho 785, 787, 537 P.2d 65, 67 (1975); Petsch v. Florom, 538 P.2d 1011, 1013 (Wyo. 1975).
94. Burk Royalty Co., v. Walls, 616 S.W.2d 911, 920 (Tex. 1981); Jeffers v. Nysse, 98
Wis. 2d 543, 297 N.W.2d 495 (1980).
95. Silberg v. California Life Ins. Co., 11 Cal. 3d 452, 462, 521 P.2d 1103, 1110, 113
Cal. Rptr. 711, 718 (1974); Shortle v. Central Vt. Pub. Serv. Corp., 137 Vt. 32, 33, 399 A.2d
517, 518 (1974); see Newton v. Standard Fire Ins. Co., 291 N.C. 105, 112, 229 S.E.2d 297, 301
(1976)(" 'fraud, malice, such a degree of negligence as indicates a reckless indifference to
consequences, oppression, insult, rudeness, caprice, willfullness' ")(quoting Baker v. Wins-
low, 184 N.C. 1, 113 S.E. 570 (1922)); Henry v. Deen, 61 N.C. App. 189, 195, 300 S.E.2d 707,
711 (1983)("based on aggravated, intentional, wanton or grossly negligent conduct"), rev'd
on other grounds, 310 N.C. 75, 310 S.E.2d 327 (1984); Rubeck v. Huffman, 54 Ohio St. 2d
20, 23, 374 N.E.2d 411, 413 (1978) ("caused by intentional, reckless, wanton, willful and gross
acts or by malice inferred from conduct and surrounding circumstances").
96. McClellan v. Highland Sales & Inv. Co., 484 S.W.2d 239, 242 (Mo. 1972). Under
this approach, some element of wantonness or bad motive must exist. Id.; see also Kline v.
Multi-Media Cablevision, Inc., 233 Kan. 188, 666 P.2d 711 (1983); Loucks v. Albuquerque
Nat'l Bank, 76 N.M. 735, 747, 418 P.2d 191, 199 (1966)("only when the conduct of the
wrongdoer may be said to be maliciously intentional, fraudulent, oppressive, or committed
recklessly or with a wanton disregard of the plaintiffs' rights").
97. Salt River Valley Water Users' Ass'n. v. Giglio, 113 Ariz. 190, 202, 549 P.2d 162,
174 (1976). The court, however, did not impose punitive damages because of plaintiffs' fail-
ure to demonstrate the requisite degree of wanton or reckless disregard. Id. at 203, 549 P.2d
at 175; see Nienstedt v. Wetzel, 133 Ariz. 348, 357, 651 P.2d 876, 885 (1982)("where the
conduct of the wrongdoer is wanton, reckless or shows spite or in will"); Currie v. Dooley,
132 Ariz. 584, 589, 647 P.2d 1182, 1187 (1982) (where the defendant's conduct "is wanton,
1136
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attempted to amalgamate all of the various characterizations of the
reckless standard into one sentence. Tennessee courts will allow
punitive damages
in cases involving fraud, malice, gross negligence or oppression, .. or where
a wrongful act is done with a bad motive or so recklessly as to imply a disre-
gard of social obligation .... or where there is such willful misconduct or
entire want of care as to raise a presumption of conscious indifference to
consequences."
The standards for measuring reckless or wanton conduct are
confusing and devoid of any effective definition. Scholars univer-
sally have acknowledged the absence of any meaningful characteri-
zation.99 Jurors motivated by the noble desire to render a fair ver-
dict simply cannot fathom the intricacies in meaning and subtle
connotations that characterize the different standards for measur-
reckless or shows spite or ill will").
98. Richardson v. Gibalski, 625 S.W.2d 715, 717 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1979)(quoting Inland
Container Corp. v. March, 529 S.W.2d 43, 45 (Tenn. 1975)). A similar amalgamated stan-
dard prevails in Montana. In the recent case of Kuiper v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 673
P.2d 1208 (Montana 1983), relying on Graham v. Clarks Fork Nat'l Bank, 631 P.2d 718
(Montana 1981), the court defined the wrongful act as "characterized by some such circum-
stances of aggravation, as willfulness, wantonness, malice, oppression, brutality, insult, reck-
lessness, gross negligence, or gross fraud on the part of the defendant." 673 P.2d at 1213-14.
99. See supra note 78, for Dean Prosser's and Professor McCormick's standards for
justifying the imposition of punitive damages. Some commentators have elected to divide
antisocial conduct into two categories: (1) that conduct which indicates that the defendant
desired to cause the harm that the plaintiff sustained, or at least believed that the harm was
substantially certain to follow from the conduct; and (2) situations in which the defendant
knew, or should have had reason to know, not only that his conduct created an unreasonable
risk of harm, but also that a strong probability-although not a substantial cer-
tainty-existed that the harm would result but, nevertheless, he proceeded with his conduct
in reckless or conscious disregard of the consequences. J. GHLRDI & J. KmcHER, supra note
9, § 5.01 at 8-9. These categories, however, appear to be the equivalent of the intentional and
reckless or wanton categories. This characterization provides little illumination and even
less meaningful guidance in applying the standard. This strained effort to characterize con-
duct warranting punitive damages merely dramatizes the total unsuitability of the punitive
damage concept in the arena of civil torts reparations.
Unquestionably, there exists an inherent and unintelligible confusion in this area of the
law. One commentator defined the recklessness category as conduct that does not suggest
that the actor desired to hurt anyone and in which the actor's means of achieving his objec-
tive, rather than the objective itself, is scrutinized. This commentator emphasized the subtle
differences in connotation of such terms as "conscious indifference,'""reckless disregard,"
"recklessness," and "wantonness." See Ellis, supra note 10, at 35.
Other commentators simply have labeled the basic types of conduct that warrant the
imposition of punitive damages and have failed to analyze the standards by which such
labeled conduct can be judged. See, e.g., Duffy, supra note 9, at 7 (majority of jurisdictions
allow punitive damages if the defendant's actions were wanton, malicious, or oppres-
sive)(citing Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., v. Smith, 218 Ky. 583, 136 S.W.2d 759 (1940) and 22
AM. JuR. 2D Damages § 236 (1965)); Special Project, supra note 2, at 695 (most states re-
quire that the defendant act with gross negligence, willfulness, or wantonness).
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ing reckless or wanton conduct.100 Because of the absence of any
understandable standards of measurement and the inevitably in-
consistent interpretations by juries, every defendant increasingly is
subject to the vagaries of individual jurisdictions and an unin-
formed jury.
3. Standard of Negligent Conduct
Most courts refuse to impose punitive damages for "negligent"
conduct.10 Some states purport, however, to recognize a distinc-
tion between mere negligence and gross negligence, and they invar-
iably authorize punitive damages only for the latter. s02 At least one
court has held that gross negligence, in and of itself, is not suffi-
cient to support an award of punitive damages. 03
B. The Corporate Defendant and Punitive Damages
The doctrine of vicarious liability provides a further avenue
for courts to impose punitive damages on parties other than the
actual wrongdoer.' 0 A large number of jurisdictions adhere to the
respondeat superior rule that an employer is subject to punitive
100. As one commentator has observed, jury instructions on the standards for assess-
ing punitive damages are unilluminating and, although judges usually tell the jurors that
they can award punitive damages if the defendant acted with maliciousness, willfulness,
wantonness, or in reckless disregard of the plaintiff's rights, most courts provide little if any
meaningful guidelines. Ellis, supra note 10, at 38. A dramatic example of judicial ratification
of the application of punitive damages despite judicial acknowledgement of the complete
lack of any guiding standards for the jury is found in a recent Montana case. See First Bank
(N.A.) - Billings v. TransAmerica Ins. Co., 679 P.2d 1217, 1222 (Mont. 1984).
101. W. PROSSER, supra note 34, § 2, at 10; Ellis, supra note 10, at 36.
102. W. PROSSER, supra note 34, § 2, at 10; Ellis, supra note 10, at 36-37 (but the
definition of gross negligence is unclear); see Maxey v. Freightliner Corp., 665 F.2d 1367
(5th Cir. 1982) (en banc); Ex parte Smith, 412 So. 2d 1222, 1223 (Ala. 1982); Stinson v.
Feminist Women's Health Center, Inc., 416 So. 2d 1183, 1185 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982);
Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 74 IMI. 2d 172, 186, 384, N.E.2d 353, 359 (1978); Hibschman Pon-
tiac, Inc. v. Batchelor, 266 Ind. 310, 314, 362 N.E.2d 845, 847 (1977); Sebastian v. Wood, 246
Iowa 94, 66 N.W.2d 841 (1954); Newton v. Hornblower, Inc., 224 Kan. 506, 524-25, 582 P.2d
1136, 1150 (1978); Foss v. Maine Turnpike Auth., 309 A.2d 339, 345 (Me. 1973); Seals v. St.
Regis Paper Co., 236 So. 2d 388, 392 (Miss. 1970); Burk Royalty Co. v. Walls, 616 S.W.2d
911 (Tex. 1981); Texas Pac. Coal & Oil Co. v. Robertson, 125 Tex. 4, 79 S.W.2d 830 (1935).
103. See Wolf v. Nordstrom, Inc., 291 Ore. 828, 637 P.2d 1280 (1981); Chamberlain v.
Jim Fisher Motors, Inc., 282 Ore. 229, 578 P.2d 1225 (1978).
104. W. PROSSER, supra note 34, § 2, at 12. The imposition of punitive damages based
on a theory of vicarious liability is probably the most controversial use of the doctrine. Id.
The incongruous nature of vicarious punitive damages clearly is highlighted in the case of
Martin v. Johns-Manville Corp., 469 A.2d 655 (Pa. Super. 1983), in which the court held
that punitive damages are recoverable against a successor corporation for the vicarious lia-
bility of its predecessor even though the successor corporation was not responsible for the
alleged defective product marketed by its predecessor.
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damages when an employee, while operating within the scope of
his employment, commits tortious acts that further the employer's
interests. The imposition of punitive damages vicariously on an-
other is incongruous with the objective of deterrence. Punishing
the employer or corporation for the acts of the servant simply
metes out punishment based not on opprobrious conduct but on
the mere legal relationship between the offending individual and
his employer. A number of other jurisdictions, however, adopt the
more conservative "complicity rule. '10 5 The complicity rule limits
the imposition of vicarious liability for punitive damages to situa-
tions in which a managerial agent of the employer either commits
the egregious act,10 6 specifically authorizes the act,"0 7 or ratifies the
105. The Restatement (Second) of Torts contains this formulation of the complicity
rule:
Punitive damages can properly by awarded against a master or other principal because
of an act by an agent if, but only if, (a) the principal authorized the doing and the
manner of the act, or (b) the agent was unfit and the principal was reckless in employ-
ing him, or (c) the agent was employed in a managerial capacity and was acting in the
scope of employment, or (d) the principal or a managerial agent of the principal rati-
fied or approved the act.
RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 909 (1979). The Restatement (Second) of Agency
adopts this rule verbatim. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF AGENCY § 217C (1958). This rule rep-
resents the conservative view, and a number of jurisdictions either have adopted it ex-
pressly, adopted it without mentioning it, or adopted parts of it. See, e.g., Martin v. Texaco,
Inc., 726 F.2d. 207 (5th Cir. 1984) (applying Texas law); Briner v. Hystop, 337 N.W.2d 858
(Iowa 1983). Dean Prosser has suggested that the majority of the jurisdictions have adopted
the more liberal respondeat superior rule. W. PROSSER, supra note 34, § 2, at 12. It has been
observed, however, that Dean Prosser cites an equal number of authorities for the respon-
deat superior and complicity rules. Ellis, supra note 10, at 63 n.266. Professor Ellis has
asserted that half of the states follow each rule. Id. at 63. Professor Ellis does recognize that
"Prosser's misleading statement may be on its way to becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy."
Id. at 63 n.266.
106. The drafters of the Restatement (Second) of Torts justify this liability because it
"serves as a deterrent to the employment of unfit persons for important positions." RE-
STATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 909(c) comment b, at 468 (1979). The Restatement pro-
vides no clear definition of who constitutes a managerial agent. Jurisdictions that have
adopted the complicity rule include the District of Columbia, Texas, New York, California,
and Kansas. See Jordan v. Medley, 711 F.2d 211 (D.C. App. 1983) (landlord's passive partic-
ipation while his son brandished a gun at tenants could constitute ratification of the em-
ployee's acts); Egan v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 63 Cal. App. 3d 659, 133 Cal. Rptr. 899
(1976)(claims adjuster held to be managerial agent despite title of his position); Kline v.
Multi-Media Cablevision, Inc., 233 Kan. 988, 666 P.2d 711 (1983)(punitive damages not al-
lowed for mere employee gross negligence in removing a manhole cover and then failing to
erect a protective barrier); Gill v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 284 A.D. 36, 129 N.Y.S.2d 288
(1954) (head of "protective department" of defendant held to be managerial agent of defen-
dant in action for false imprisonment); Fisher v. Carrousel Motor Hotel, Inc., 424 S.W.2d
627 (Tex. 1967)(punitive damages allowed when parties stipulated that offender was the
"manager" of the club).
107. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 909(a)(1979).
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act 0 e or when an unfit employee recklessly hired by the employer
commits the act.10 9 At least under the complicity rule, the em-
ployer or corporation has undertaken an affirmative, conscious act
in hiring an unfit employee or authorizing the egregious act of the
employee.
Courts also impose punitive damages on corporations under
the recently formulated concept of strict tort liability.1" 0 A recent
opinion by the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Cir-
cuit demonstrates the extent to which courts have expanded the
award of punitive damages in strict liability situations. In Saupitty
v. Yazoo Manufacturing Co."' the court affirmed awards of
$560,000 in compensatory damages and $440,000 in punitive dam-
ages when the plaintiff's left hand and arm were injured by a rid-
ing lawnmower the defendant had manufactured. The court sanc-
tioned the punitive award even though the plaintiff substantially
had altered the product by removing both the belt guard and the
brakes of the mower." 2 A vigorous dissent asserted that under ap-
plicable strict tort liability doctrine either of these material altera-
tions to the mower should have constituted grounds for a directed
verdict for the defendant." s The dissent also emphasized that even
if the court elected to impose strict liability under such meager
evidence, no evidence existed in the record to justify an award of
108. See id. § 909(d).
109. See id. § 909(b).
110. See, e.g., Maxey v. Freightliner Corp., 665 F.2d 1367 (5th Cir. 1982)(jury awarded
$150,000 compensatory and $10,000,000 punitive damages); Sturm, Ruger & Co. v. Day, 594
P.2d 38 (Alaska 1979), on rehearing, 615 P.2d 621 (Alaska 1980) (a jury awarded in excess of
$2,000,000 in punitive damages under strict tort liability cause of action involving defective
gun); Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 119 Cal. App. 3d 757, 174 Cal. Rptr. 348 (1981)(jury
awarded $125,000,000 in punitive damages, which Court of Appeals reduced to $3,000,000,
in Pinto rear-end case); Leichtamer v. American Motors Corp., 67 Ohio St. 2d 456, 424
N.E.2d 568 (1981)(court allowed actual and punitive damages against manufacturer in jeep
roll-over case); Rawlings Sporting Goods Co. v. Daniels, 619 S.W.2d 435 (Tex. Civ. App.
1981) (affirming imposition of $750,000 in punitive damages).
111. 726 F.2d 657 (10th Cir. 1984).
112. The court acknowledged that Oklahoma courts would refuse to hold a manufac-
turer liable if an unforeseeable subsequent modification caused the plaintiff's injuries. Id. at
659 (citing Texas Metal Fabricating Co. v. Northern Gas Prods. Corp., 404 F.2d 921 (10th
Cir. 1968)). The court, however, chose to ignore factual evidence that the brakes could have
averted the accident, and that the plaintiff's injuries resulted from his fingers being caught
between the exposed belt and its pulley rather than from the mower blades. Saupitty, 726
F.2d at 660-61 (Seth, C.J., dissenting). Instead, the majority stated that "construing all of
the evidence and the inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, we
cannot conclude that the removal of either the mower's brakes or its belt guard constituted
a superseding, intervening cause of plaintiff's injury as a matter of law." Id. at 659-60.




The imposition of punitive damages in the strict liability con-
text also has been assailed on the grounds that punitive damages
traditionally are awarded in tort actions in which the compensa-
tory damages are premised on conduct, while compensatory dam-
ages in strict tort liability actions are based solely on the condition
of the product.11 5 Strict tort liability rests entirely on the socioeco-
nomic policy of risk distribution. Following this rationale, the
product supplier is essentially blameless. Liability is visited upon
the product supplier on the theoretical basis that the supplier is
the entity best able to absorb the loss suffered by a product user
simply by distributing the added cost to the marketing public and
by purchasing additional insurance. Consequently, courts in strict
liability cases award compensatory damages because of the condi-
tion of the product, not the conduct of the product supplier. Puni-
tive damages in a strict tort liability context, therefore, would seem
to be plainly illogical because neither punishment nor deterrence
of conduct is at issue.
1 1 6
An equally compelling argument against punitive damages in a
strict liability context is that such awards in product liability cases
produce economically and socially undesirable results.1 1 7 The grav-
est danger in products liability is that an aggregate of punitive
awards can bankrupt or financially cripple a business.," One com-
mentator has observed that the recent trend toward more substan-
tial punitive damage verdicts has reached the point at which the
114. Id. at 661 (Seth, C.J., dissenting).
115. Piper Aircraft Corp. v. Coulter, 426 So. 2d 1108, 1109 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983);
Phipps v. General Motors Corp., 278 Md. 337, 343, 363 A.2d 955, 958 (1976); Wangen v.
Ford Motor Co., 97 Wis. 2d 260, 265-66, 294 N.W.2d 437, 441 (1980).
116. See Sales, supra note 2, at 380, 389-90. Several courts have rejected the applica-
tion of punitive damages in strict tort liability actions. Gold v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp.,
553 F. Supp. 482 (D.N.J. 1982); Butcher v. Robertshaw Controls Co., 550 F. Supp. 692 (D.
Md. 1981); Walbrun v. Berkel, Inc., 433 F. Supp. 384 (E.D. Wis. 1976).
117. The defendant unsuccessfully argued this in Wangen v. Ford Motor Co., 97 Wis.
2d 260, 288, 294 N.W.2d 437, 453. Another argument against punitive damages in this area
holds that manufacturers do not demonstrate the requisite degree of malice or quasi-cruni-
nal intent. See, e.g., Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 119 Cal. App. 3d 757, 174 Cal. Rptr. 348
(1981); Leichtamer v. American Motors Co., 67 Ohio St. 2d 456, 424 N.E.2d 568 (1981).
118. K. REDDEN, supra note 1, at 118-19 (discussing excessive awards that cripple a
corporate defendant); Special Project, supra note 2, at 806-45 (discussing recent bankrupt-
cies). This possibility and other compelling concerns are delineated clearly by the dissent of
Justice Rovira in Palmer v. A. H. Robins Co., 684 P.2d 187 (Colo. 1984). The Palmer major-
ity rather glibly glosses over the significant issues that present philosophical impediments to
the imposition of punitive damages in product liability actions. Id. at 228 (Rovira, J.,
dissenting).
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question must be posed whether the goal of punitive damages is
"punishment of the defendant or actually his annihilation." '119
Courts, however, increasingly ignore or only superficially address
these arguments in their affirmation of punitive damage awards
against manufacturers in a strict tort liability context.120 The situa-
tion in strict tort liability is exacerbated by the fact that liability
may be predicated on an alleged defective design or a defective
warning on the product. Products are marketed in certain design
lines and literally millions of identically designed or marketed
products may exist. If punitive damages may be awarded repeat-
edly for the same design or marketing deficiency, then indeed, the
punitive damage doctrine may be utilized to punish a product sup-
plier to the point of economic destruction. 2 ' Several recent deci-
119. K. REDDEN, supra note 1, at 714.
120. See Acosta v. Honda Motor Co., 717 F.2d 828 (3d Cir. 1983); Moran v. Johns-
Manville Sales Corp., 691 F.2d 811 (6th Cir. 1982); Campus Sweater & Sportswear v. M.B.
Kahn Constr., 515 F. Supp. 64 (D.S.C. 1979), af'd, 644 F.2d 877 (4th Cir. 1981); Sturm,
Ryer & Co. v. Day, 594 P.2d 38 (Alaska 1979), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 894 (1981); Grimshaw
v. Ford Motor Co., 119 Cal. App. 3d 757, 174 Cal. Rptr. 348 (1981); Cloroben Chem. Corp. v.
Comegys, 464 A.2d 887 (Del. Super. Ct. 1983); Piper Aircraft Corp. v. Coulter, 426 So. 2d
1108 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983); Froud v. Celotex Corp., 107 Inl. App. 3d 654, 437 N.E.2d 910
(1982) rev'd on other grounds, 98 IMI. 2d 1324, 456 N.E.2d 131 (1983); Grye v. Dayton-Hud-
son Corp., 297 N.W.2d 727 (Minn. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 921 (1980); Rinker v. Ford
Motor Co., 567 S.W.2d 655 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978); Leichtamer v. American Motorist Corp., 67
Ohio St. 2d 456, 424 N.E.2d 568 (1981); Thiry v. Armstrong World Indus., 661 P.2d 515
(Okla. 1983); Rawlings Sporting Goods Co. v Daniels, 619 S.W.2d 435 (Tex. Civ. App. 1981);
Wangen v. Ford Motor Co., 97 Wis. 2d 260, 294 N.W.2d 437 (1980); Some courts have ac-
knowledged the obvious-that punitive damages are incompatable with the theory of strict
tort liability. Gold v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 553 F. Supp. 482 (D. N.J. 1982); Butcher
v. Robershaw Controls Co., 550 F. Supp. 692, 705 (D. Md. 1981).
121. Some courts eschew this concern based on the absence of confirmed empirical
data and conclude, therefore, that the potential for serious harm is of no moment. See
Acosta v. Honda Motor Co., 717 F.2d 828 (3d Cir. 1983). The court did note, however, that
"[i]t is, of course, possible that a sufficiently egregious error as to one product could result
in the demise of its manufacturer." Id. at 838. In Moran v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 691
F.2d 811, 817 (6th Cir. 1982), the court simply suggested that if punitive damages pose a
real threat, then the federal or state legislature should provide the relief. In Campus
Sweater & Sportwear Co. v. M. B. Kahn Constr. Co., 515 F. Supp. 64, 107 (D.S.C. 1979),
aff'd, 644 F.2d 877 (4th Cir. 1981), the threat of multiple punitive awards purportedly
"forces a prudent manufacturer intent on maximizing profits to hesitate before marketing a
known defective or an untested product." Most recently, in Fischer v. Johns-Manville Corp.,
193 N.J. Super. 113, 472 A.2d 577, (1984), the court failed the business community of this
country and strongly endorsed the precept that "it is only the threat of punitive damages
which ultimately can induce these entrepreneurs and others to act with a reasonable modi-
cum of responsibility." Id. at 125, 472 A.2d at 584 (emphasis added). These attitudes
strongly suggest the urgent necessity for the more thoughtful, rational, and dispassionate
legislative process to address this significant and continually escalating problem in the tort
reparation system. See Sturm, Ruger & Co. v. Day, 594 P.2d 38, 47 (Alaska 1979); Gryc v.
Dayton-Hudson Corp., 297 N.W.2d 727, 741 (Minn.) cert. denied, 449 U.S. 921 (1980); State
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sions, unmindful of the concern for the continued economic viabil-
ity of product suppliers, have acknowledged that the bankruptcy
or other form of annihilation of a product supplier by the repeated
imposition of punitive damage awards could be justified and judi-
cially sanctioned. 2'
The Fifth Circuit recently recognized the serious problem of
supplier annihilation in Jackson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp.
12 8
and elected to reject the punitive damages concept in the area of
industry-wide asbestos related litigation. The Fifth Circuit recog-
nized that economic loss distribution represented the primary ob-
jective of strict tort liability124 and noted that one court had sug-
gested that "the demise of the manufacturer in such circumstances
is not a 'necessarily untenable' result." 25 The Fifth Circuit, how-
ever, refused to accept this draconian result and stated that "[a]t
the point where awards of punitive damages destroy the viability
of the enterprises necessary to accomplish loss distribution, the
remedy of punitive damages becomes incompatible with the strict
liability cause of action. ' 128 The court's major rationale was the
ex rel. Young v. Crookham, 290 Or. 61, 618 P.2d 1268 (1980); Wangen v. Ford Motor Co., 97
Wis. 2d 260, 285-86, 294 N.W.2d 437, 451 (1980). Unfortunately, punitive damages also are
awarded for conduct less egregious than marketing a known defective product. See, e.g.,
Worderson v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 681 P.2d 1038 (Kan. 1984); Willis v. Floyd Brace
Co. [1983-1984 Transfer Binder] PROD. LIAB. REP. (CCH) 9862 (S.C. Nov. 14, 1983).
122. For example in Acosta v. Honda Motor Co., 717 F.2d 828, 838 (3d Cir. 1983), the
Third Circuit observed that, "[i]t is, of course, possible that 'a sufficiently egregious error as
to one product' could result in the demise of its manufacturer, but such a result is not
inevitable." In a supporting footnote, the court further observed, "[N]or is such a result
necessarily untenable." More recently, in Martin v. Johns-Manville Corp., 469 A.2d 655, 665
(Pa. Super. 1983), appeal filed, Apr. 2, 1984, the court, in an equally off-handed manner,
commented that, "if the defendant's conduct was so reckless and injured so many people,
that the effect of the damages awarded against it is bankruptcy, we are hard pressed to
understand why that defendant should not be required to live with the consequences of its
actions." A similar view has been expressed by the Oregon court in State ex. rel. Young v.
Crookham, 290 Or. 61, 618 P.2d 1268 (1980). In Fischer v. Johns-Manville Corp., 193 N.J.
Super. 113, 472 A.2d 577, (1984), the state court echoed, in less than moderate tones, the
importance of exacting a pound of flesh from reckless defendants in its statement demand-
ing "the ultimate protection which punitive damages afford." Id. at 127, 472 A.2d at 585.
The courts likewise have rejected application of the double jeopardy principle to foreclose
repeated punitive damage awards for identical product design defects. See Hansen v. Johns-
Manville Corp., 734 F.2d 1036 (5th Cir. 1984).
123. 727 F.2d 506 (5th Cir. 1984) (rehearing en banc granted).
124. Id. at 525.
125. Id. at 528 (citing Acosta v. Honda Motor Co., 717 F.2d at 838, n.15).
126. Jackson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 727 F.2d 506, 526 (5th Cir.) reh'g en banc
granted, - F.2d - (5th Cir. 1984). The court stated:
We do not reach the issue whether Mississippi would find punitive damages inher-
ently incompatible with the theory of strict liability in all cases. Our holding today is
limited to the extraordinary circumstances of this litigation, where the allowance of
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continued financial viability of manufacturers, which would insure
compensation for the projected future thousands of asbestosis
claimants. The judges expressed a reluctance to provide a windfall
to the current plaintiffs at the expense of future claimants who
conceivably would be foreclosed from recovering even compensa-
tory damages if repeated punitive awards continue to bankrupt
manufacturers. Of course, the court did consider, in rejecting the
punitive damages award, that the continued viability of product
suppliers is the very essence of society's continued economic
existence.
The Fifth Circuit's decision in Jackson is an implicit recogni-
tion of a problem that must concern the courts: should the judici-
ary determine whether businesses which constitute the underpin-
ning of this society's economy continue to exist and remain viable
as the producer of products necessary to service society and as the
employer of the millions of individuals composing society? The
avowed purpose of the punitive damage doctrine never has been
and never should be the economic destruction of business entities.
If such decisions should be imposed, they should emanate from a
duly elected and representative legislative body. The destruction of
businesses, the loss of thousands of jobs, the repeated trauma to
the American economy, and the significantly increased product
costs to consumers should not be the objective of any system. The
current antibusiness attitude reflected in the multitude of recent
decisions is troubling. Such judicially mandated, economically ad-
verse consequences exceed society's tolerance of judicial activism,
and punitive sentences of death for corporations should no longer
punitive damages carries the manifest portent of undoing the strict liability remedy for
present and prospective claimants and where the purposes of punitive damages are
otherwise served.
We cannot predict, of course, whether other jurisdictions would subscribe to our
approach in this litigation. From that perspective, our efforts to preserve the viability
of strict liability compensation may be infected with an element of futility. The alter-
native, however, appears to be no solution at all, but mere resignation to defeat of the
purposes of both strict liability and punitive damages. A fully satisfactory solution
would require properly crafted federal legislation. Since that has not come to pass, we
must proceed with fundamental justice as our guide.
The disallowance of punitive damages in this situation expresses this court's cen-
tral concern for the continued viability of the strict liability cause of action for present
and future claimants. Where strict liability for compensatory damages imposes ade-
quate punishment as it does in this type of case, we decline to cleave to a judge-made
remedy of punitive damages that would both fail in its own purpose and obstruct the
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be permitted under the guise of a civil tort compensation system.
C. Other Factors Affecting Punitive Damage Awards
Most jurisdictions adhere to the rule that actual or compensa-
tory damages are a prerequisite to an award of punitive dam-
ages.12 7 The amount of actual or compensatory damages required
are not specifically defined and, generally, nominal actual damages
suffice. 128
Perhaps the two factors that most significantly affect the
amount of punitive damages awarded are the ratio rule and evi-
dence of the defendant's financial condition. The ratio rule is a
mechanism that allows an appellate court either to overturn a pu-
nitive damage award or to order remittitur if the court concludes
that a reasonable relation does not exist between the compensatory
and punitive damages awarded the plaintiff.129 Most jurisdictions
mandate that punitive awards bear a "reasonable relationship" to
the amount of compensatory damages,130 but no court ever has es-
127. See, e.g., Williams v. Carr, 263 Ark. 326, 565 S.W.2d 400 (1978); American Motor-
cycle Inst., Inc. v. Mitchell, 380 So. 2d 452 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980); Pringle Tax Servs.,
Inc. v. Knoblauch, 282 N.W.2d 151 (Iowa 1979); Traylor v. Wachter, 227 Kan. 221, 607 P.2d
1094 (1980); Robison v. Katz, 94 N.M. 314, 610 P.2d 201 (1980); Fort Worth Elevators Co. v.
Russell, 123 Tex. 128, 70 S.W.2d 397 (1934); Cates v. Barb, 650 P.2d 1159 (Wyo. 1982).
128. W. PROSSER, supra note 34, § 2, at 13-14; see, e.g., Nelson v. Hartman, 648 P.2d
1176, 1178 (Mont. 1982) (no error in failing to admit defendant's driving record for punitive
damages purposes because no punitive damages can exist without actual liability entitling
the plaintiff to actual damages); Fort Worth Elevators Co. v. Russell, 123 Tex. 128, 149-50,
70 S.W. 2d 397, 409 (1934) (proof of actual damage prerequisite to punitive award); see
generally Duffy, supra note 9, at 8; Ellis, supra note 10, at 54 (citing CoMmITTER ON STAN-
DARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS, CIvIL, OF THE SUPERIOR COURT OF Los ANGELES, CALIFORNIA JURY
INSTRUCTIONS: CIVIL § 14.71 (Supp. 1981)); Sales, supra note 2, at 365; Note, 70 HARv. L.
REV. 517, 528-29 (1957).
129. K. REDDEN, supra note 1, at 63.
130. Ellis, supra note 10, at 58 (citing D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF REMEDIES
§ 3.9, at 210-11 (1973) and W. PROSSER, supra note 34, § 2, at 14)); Sales, supra note 2, at
366; Special Project, supra note 2, at 696. Some states, however, require no relationship
whatever between punitive and compensatory awards. See, e.g., Pinckard v. Dunnavant, 206
So. 2d 340, 344 (Ala. 1968) (exemplary award need not be mathematically related to com-
pensatory award); Ray Dodge, Inc. v. Moore, 251 Ark. 1036, 1046, 479 S.W.2d 518, 524
(1972) (factors other than ratio of punitive damages and actual damages to be considered);
Lassitter v. International Union of Operating Eng'rs, 349 So. 2d 622, 626 (Fla. 1976) (puni-
tive damages not required to be proportionate to compensatory damages); Southwestern
Inv. Co. v. Neeley, 452 S.W.2d 705 (Tex. 1970) (punitive damages need only be reasonably
proportional to actual damages); see generally Leimgruber v. Claridge Assocs., 73 N.J. 450,
457-59, 375 A.2d 652, 656-57 (1977) (discussing split among jurisdictions regarding "ratio"
rule). Some courts have stated that an award which is extremely disproportional indicates
that the jury acted with passion or prejudice. Dearmore v. Gold, 400 F.2d 887, 888 (5th Cir.
1968) (a ratio of 11 to 1 was too disproportional); Alley v. Gubser Dev. Co., 569 F. Supp. 36,
40 (D. Colo. 1983) (a ratio of 17 to 1 was too disproportional). In contrast, in Moore v.
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tablished a fixed or precise ratio. 13 1 The rule, consequently, is any-
thing but precise, and as one commentator has noted, its singular
value is to serve as a "rough device to allow a court to pare down
an excessive award of punitive damages. ' 132 In an effort to instill
some element of certainty into the ratio rule, some courts have
suggested that fact finders may consider certain factors in deter-
mining the issue of excessiveness of punitive awards: (1) the nature
of the wrong; (2) the character of the conduct at issue; (3) the de-
gree of the wrongdoer's culpability; (4) the situation and sensibili-
ties of the concerned parties; and (5) the extent to which the con-
duct offends the public sense of justice and propriety.133 Despite
American United Life Ins. Co., 150 Cal. App. 3d 610, 636, 197 Cal. Rptr. 878, 894-95 (1984),
a ratio of 83 to 1 was approved (citing Wetherbee v. United Ins. Co. of Am., 18 Cal. App. 3d
266, 95 Cal. Rptr. 678 (1971) (approving a punitive award ratio of 200 to 1)); accord Kerr v.
Fruit Commodity Corp. of Boston, 735 F.2d 281 (8th Cir. 1984) (citing Price v. Ford Motor
Credit Co., 530 S.W.2d 249 (Mo. App. 1975) (that Missouri has approved a 40 to 1 ratio));
Robison v. Lescrenier, 721 F.2d 1101, 1113 (7th Cir. 1983) (applying Wisconsin law); Palmer
v. A.H. Robins Co., No. 81SA149 (Colo. June 4, 1984) (en banc) (approving a ratio of 10.3 to
1 when the basic compensatory damage award was $600,000, resulting in a punitive damage
award of $6,200,000).
131. Wetherbee v. United Ins. Co. of Am., 18 Cal. App. 3d 266, 95 Cal. Rptr. 678
(1971); K. REDDEN, supra note 1, at 63-64 (citing Malcolm v. Little, 295 A.2d 711 (Del.
1972)). The imprecise nature of the rule is exemplified by the charge of the trial court that
was approved on appeal by the Fifth Circuit in Martin v. Texaco, Inc., 726 F.2d 207 (5th
Cir. 1984). The trial court, in instructing the jury on the standard for measuring punitive
awards under Texas law, stated:
The appropriate ratio will vary from case to case, depending on such factors as the
character of the wrongful conduct, the extent to which the defendant is involved in the
conduct and the extent to which that conduct offends a public sense of justice and
propriety. A very recent court decision, last week as a matter of fact, listed five relevant
factors for reviewing a jury's award of punitive damages, as follows: (1) The nature of
the wrong; (2) The character of the conduct involved; (3) The degree of culpability of
the wrongdoer; (4) The situation and sensibility of the parties; (5) The extent to which
defendant's conduct offends a public sense of justice and propriety. Clearly, ladies and
gentlemen, this is not an exact science, but is a concept that is very well dealt with by a
jury. Now, for your further guidance, I have a few additional instructions. If you find
liability in this case, then the decision is solely yours; consider the five guidelines that I
gave you and find exemplary damages that you find appropriate in this case.
Id. at 213-14.
132. K. REDDEN, supra note 1, at 64.
133. See Maxey v. Freightliner Corp., 665 F.2d 1367, 1377-78 (5th Cir. 1982) (Fifth
Circuit adopted the factors set forth in Alamo Nat'l Bank v. Kraus 616 S.W.2d 908 (Tex.
1981), but found that the defendant's behavior did not justify an award of $10,000,000 in
punitive damages based on a compensatory award of $150,000); Alamo, 616 S.W. 2d at 910
(court held that appellate court's review of these factors was not an erroneous standard, and
allowed $500,000 in punitive damages and $12,900 in compensatory damages to stand); see
also Leimgruber v. Claridge Assocs., 73 N.J. 450, 456-61, 375 A.2d 652, 655-58 (1977) (court
upheld award of $16,500 in punitive and $1700 in compensatory damages because the
awards did not "give rise- to the inference of mistake, passion, prejudice, or partiality,"
"shock the conscience," or "result in a manifest denial of justice"). The Leimgruber court
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these efforts, one scholar critically noted that "[t]his test is pro-
bably more often a rationalization of results than a means of
obtaining them. The proper ratio between actual damages is
placed at a figure which supports the judge's view of the
verdict.. ,,'s. Another commentator has argued for more effec-
tive appellate review by asserting that "it is becoming increasingly
clear that it is preferable for the court to have the simple right to
set aside an award as excessive. ' 13 5 To permit punitive damages in
the absence of a severely limiting ratio of punitive to actual dam-
ages simply invites disaster.
Many jurisdictions authorize the fact finder to consider the
defendant's wealth in assessing punitive damages."'8 In these juris-
dictions, the wealthier the defendant, the larger the permissible as-
sessment of a punitory award.13 7 The rule is premised on the ra-
tionale that the function of deterrence will not be served if the
defendant can absorb the penalty with little or no discomfort be-
cause of existent wealth.138 One court has sought to justify evi-
dence of a defendant's financial wealth by stating that "what
would be 'smart money' to a poor man would not be, and would
not serve as a deterrent, to a rich man."13
Several significant problems arise when courts allow juries to
alluded to the following factors: (1) the nature of wrongdoing; (2) the extent of harm; (3) the
intent of party committing the act; (4) the wealth of the perpetrator; and (5) any mitigating
circumstance that may reduce damages. Id. at 456, 375 A.2d at 656-57. The court in Alley v.
Gubser Dev. Co., 569 F. Supp. 36, 40 (D. Colo. 1983), articulated a similar standard of anal-
ysis. Another variant of this approach is reflected in Cates v. Eddy, 669 P.2d 912, 921 (Wyo.
1983). California predicates an award for punitive damages on a combination of three fac-
tors: the nature of defendant's acts; the amount of compensatory damages awarded; and the
wealth of the defendant. See Professional Seminar Consultants v. Sino Am. Tech. Exch.
Council, 727 F.2d 1470, 1473 (9th Cir. 1984) (applying California law); Neal v. Farmer's Ins.
Exch., 21 Cal. 3d 910, 582 P.2d 980, 148 Cal. Rptr. 389 (1978); see also Comment, Punitive
Damages and the Reasonable Relation Rule: A Study in Frustration of Purpose, 9 PAc.
L.J. 823 (1978).
134. Morris, Punitive Damages in Tort Cases, 44 HARv. L. REV. 1173, 1180 (1931).
135. K. REDDEN, supra note 1, at 43.
136. See K. REDDEN, supra note 1, at 61; Ellis, supra note 10, at 54; Special Project,
supra note 2, at 695-96. Three states, Alabama, Kentucky, and Texas, do not allow consider-
ation of the defendant's wealth. Special Project, supra note 2, at 696 n.753; see also RE-
STATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 908 (1979) (trier of fact may consider defendant's wealth in
assessing punitive awards).
137. Ellis, supra note 10, at 61.
138. Neal v. Farmers Ins. Exch. 21 Cal. 3d 910, 929, 582 P.2d 980, 991, 148 Cal. Rptr.
389, 400 (1978) (award of $740,000 in punitive damages proper when it amounts to less than
a week's worth of defendant's net income); Moore v. American United Life Ins. Co., 150 Cal.
App. 3d 610, , 197 Cal. Rptr. 878, 899 (1984) (amount equal to 3.4 weeks of company's
net annual income is appropriate).
139. Hall v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 252 N.W.2d 421, 424 (Iowa 1977).
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consider the defendant's wealth. First, ill informed juries generally
overreact to the emotion provoking nature of evidence of a defen-
dant's wealth. One commentator observed that:
It is a good guess that rich men do not fare well before juries, and the more
emphasis placed on their riches, the less well they fare. Such evidence may do
more harm than good; jurymen may be more interested in divesting vested
interests than in attempting to fix penalties which will make for effective
working of the admonitory function.140
Second, evidence of the defendant's wealth undoubtedly influences
juries to award punitive damages in excess of any rational
amount.14 1 As an unintended consequence, financially poor code-
fendants are prejudiced unfairly if they are jointly and severally
liable for a punitive damages award that the jury has inflated be-
cause of the other defendant's wealth."4 " Fortunately, not all juris-
dictions adhere to this rationale.143 Permitting the fact finder to
consider evidence of a wrongdoer's wealth is really nothing more
than a camouflaged mechanism designed to encourage large puni-
tive assessments. In essence, it is a procedural device that pro-
motes the redistribution of wealth in society.
D. Additional Patchwork Applications of the Punitive Damage
Concept Among the Various Jurisdictions
Some jurisdictions have imposed certain limitations on the pu-
nitive damage doctrine that regrettably often serve to further
muddy the water for practitioners and jurors. Some states, under a
strict products liability theory, disallow punitive damages for prop-
erty damage because the interests concerned in actions for prop-
erty damage do not warrant the extension of this controversial doc-
trine.144 Courts do not universally prohibit punitive awards for
property damage, however, and such awards have occurred in ag-
gravated circumstances of trespass, conversion, infringement of
common law copyright, nuisance, and seizure of property by a se-
cured party.2
45
Many jurisdictions restrict punitive damages by refusing to
140. Morris, supra note 133, at 1191.
141. K. REDDEN, supra note 1, at 61-62.
142. Id. at 62.
143. See, e.g., Texas Pub. Utils. Corp. v. Edwards, 99 S.W.2d 420, 427 (Tex. Civ. App.
1936) (improper for plaintiff's counsel to argue to jury that it should assess large punitive
damages because defendant could afford to pay them).
144. See, e.g., Eisert v. Greenberg Roofing & Sheet Metal Co., 314 N.W.2d 226, 228-29
(Minn. 1982).
145. K. REDDEN, supra note 1, at 101-09.
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permit such awards for breach of contract."" As might be ex-
pected, however, other jurisdictions authorize punitive awards for
mere contract breaches. In addition, even jurisdictions that gen-
erally exclude punitive awards for breaches of contract have for-
mulated exceptions to the general rule. For example, an intentional
breach of contract to marry 48 and a breach of contract by carriers
or public servants14 9 constitute exceptions in some jurisdictions.
The basis of these punitive awards, however, usually lies not in the
contractural breach itself, but in some tortious element of the de-
fendant's conduct to which the fact finder links the award.
150
Another area of nonuniform application is the applicability of
punitive damages in wrongful death and survival actions. A signifi-
cant number of jurisdictions prohibit punitive damages in wrongful
death actions because these statutory causes of action specifically
serve a compensatory purpose.M The Seventh Circuit recently dis-
146. The Restatement of Contracts provides that, "Punitive damages are not recover-
able for breach of contract." RESTATEMENT OF CoNTRAcrs § 342 (1932); see Note, supra note
16, at 531. The author emphasizes, however, that courts will allow punitive damages in
many modem torts that are closely related to breach of contract, such as inducing another
to breach a contract and wrongful termination of services by a public utility. Id.; see Royal
Typewriter Co. v. Xerographic Supplies Corp., 719 F.2d 1092, 1106 (11th Cir. 1983) (Florida
does not allow punitive damages awards for breach of warranty claims under the Uniform
Commercial Code); Saval v. BL Ltd., 710 F.2d 1027, 1033 (4th Cir. 1983) (Maryland does
not permit punitive damages for contract breaches absent malice); Superior Trucks, Inc. v.
Allen, 664 S.W.2d 136 (Tex. Ct. App. 1983) (exemplary damages not allowed for breach of
warranty); Ryan Mortgage Investors v. Fleming-Wood, 650 S.W.2d 928, 937 (Tex. Ct. App.
1983) (exemplary damages not permitted for breach of contract).
147. See, e.g., Canada Dry Corp. v. Nehi Beverage Co., 723 F.2d 512, 524 (7th Cir.
1983) (applying Indiana law); Henderson v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 620 F.2d
530 (5th Cir. 1980) (applying Mississippi law), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1034 (1980); Robison v.
Katz, 94 N.M. 314, 610 P.2d 201 (1980).
148. See, e.g., Smith v. Hawkins, 120 Kan. 518, 243 P. 1018 (1926); Baumle v. Verde,
33 Okla. 243, 124 P. 1083 (1912); see also K. REDDEN, supra note 1, at 41.
149. See, e.g., Birmingham Water Works Co. v. Keiley, 2 Ala. App. 629, 56 So. 838
(1911); Kohler v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 192 Kan. 226, 387 P.2d 149 (1963); Southwest-
ern Gas & Elec. Co. v. Stanley, 45 S.W.2d 671 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931), aff'd, 123 Tex. 157, 70
S.W.2d 413 (1934); see also K. REDDEN, supra note 1, at 41.
150. K. REDDEN, supra note 1, at 41; see Sullivan, Punitive Damages in the Law of
Contract: The Reality and the Illusion of Legal Change, 61 MINN. L. Rzv. 207 (1977). For a
discussion of the allowance of punitive damages for tortious breach of contractual duties
when a fidiciary duty exists, when an independent tort accompanies the breach of contract,
when the defendant's conduct is also fraudulent, and when the defendant failed to deal
fairly and in good faith, see K. REDDEN, supra note 1, at 52-53.
151. Comment, Disallowing Punitive Damages for Wrongful Death While Allowing
Them for Personal Injury and Property Damage Held To Be a Denial of Equal Protection,
8 Cum. L. REv. 567, 574-76 (1977). The author indicates that only 18 states allow recovery of
punitive damages in wrongful death actions. Id. at 574-75. Alabama occupies the unique
position of allowing only punitive damages in wrongful death actions. Eich v. Town of Gulf
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missed the punitive damages claims in wrongful death actions in
several states that arose from a catastrophic airplane crash.152 The
court concluded that it should resolve the conflict of laws questions
in the case in favor of federal regulation of airline tort liability,
which prohibits punitive damages, because of the interests of pas-
sengers, airline corporations, airplane manufacturers, and state and
federal governments. 153 Other jurisdictions, nonetheless, hold that
punitive damages are appropriate in wrongful death actions.
1 54
Contrary to the prohibition of punitive damages in wrongful
death actions, many jurisdictions authorize the recovery of puni-
tive damages in survival actions. 55 Numerous jurisdictions, how-
ever, refuse to permit punitive damage claims against the estates
of deceased wrongdoers158 because the punishment and deterrence
rationales no longer are viable once the wrongdoer is deceased.
157
Shores, 293 Ala. 95, 300 So. 2d 354 (1974); see also Rosenfeld v. Isaacs, 79 A.D.2d 630, 631,
433 N.Y.S.2d 623, 624 (1980).
152. In re Air Crash Disaster Near Chicago, 644 F.2d 594 (7th Cir. cert. denied, 454
U.S. 878 (1981).
153. Id. at 632-33; accord, In re Paris Air Crash, 622 F.2d 1315 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 976 (1980); Eisert v. Greenberg Roofing & Sheet Metal Co., 314 N.W.2d 226 (Minn.
1982).
154. See Boies v. Cole, 99 Ariz. 198, 407 P.2d 917 (1965); Gavica v. Hanson, 101 Idaho
58, 608 P.2d 861 (1980); Heil Co. v. Grant, 534 S.W.2d 916, 926 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976);
Behrens v. Raleigh Hills Hosp. Inc., 675 P.2d 1179 (Utah 1983).
155. See, e.g., Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of California, 17 Cal. 3d 425, 450,
551 P.2d 334, 353, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14, 33, (1976) (allowance of punitive damages in tort ac-
tions generally is applicable only to survival actions and not to wrongful death actions); ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 111 2/, § 77 (1966 & Supp. 1984-1985) (permits punitive damages in survival
actions under the express provisions of the Public Utilities Act).
156. See, e.g., Barnes v. Smith, 305 F.2d 226 (10th Cir. 1962); Sullivan v. Associated
Billposters and Distribs. of United States and Canada, 6 F.2d 1000 (2nd Cir. 1925); Sanchez
v. Marguez, 457 F. Supp. 359 (D. Colo. 1978) (statutory prohibition); Paul v. Milburn, 275 F.
Supp. 105 (W.D. Tenn. 1967); Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Hill, 245 F. Supp. 796 (W.D. Mo.
1965); Amos v. Prom, 115 F. Supp. 127 (N.D. Iowa 1953); Holm Timber Indus. v. Plywood
corp. of Am., 242 Cal. App. 2d 492, 51 Cal. Rptr. 597 (1966); Simone v. McKee, 142 Cal.
App. 2d 307, 298 P.2d 667 (1956); Rowen v. LeMars Mut. Ins. Co., 282 N.W.2d 639 (Iowa
1979); Wolder v. Rahm, 249 N.W.2d 630 (Iowa 1977); Stevenson v. Stoufer, 237 Iowa 513, 21
N.W.2d 287 (1946); Thompson v. Estate of Petroff, 319 N.W.2d 400 (Minn. 1982); Mervis v.
Wolverton, 211 So. 2d 847 (Miss. 1968) (statutory prohibition); Summa Corp. v. Greenspun,
96 Nev. 247, 607 P.2d 569 (1980) modified, 98 Nev. Adv. Ops. 157, 655 P.2d 513 (1982);
Allen v. Anderson, 93 Nev. 204, 562 P.2d 487 (1977); Gordon v. Nathan, 43 A.D.2d 917, 352
N.Y.S.2d 464 (1974) (statutory prohibition); Thorpe v. Wilson, 58 N.C. App. 292, 293 S.E.2d
675 (1982); McAdams v. Blue, 3 N.C. App. 169, 164 S.E.2d 490 (1968); Morriss v. Barton,
200 Okla. 4, 190 P.2d 451 (1947); Pearson v. Galvin, 253 Or. 331, 454 P.2d 638 (1969); Ash-
craft v. Saunders, 251 Or. 139, 444 P.2d 924 (1968); Hayes v. Gill, 216 Tenn. 39, 390 S.W.2d
213 (1965); Dalton v. Johnson, 204 Va. 102, 129 S.E.2d 647 (1963).
157. Allen v. Anderson, 562 P.2d at 489-90. The Restatement (Second) of Torts also
adopts this view:
Under statutes providing for the survival or revival of tort actions, the damages for
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Florida, Illinois, West Virginia, and Texas, however, have adopted
a contrary rule.15 8 Permitting a punitive award in the case of a de-
ceased defendant truly exposes the fallacy of the punitive damage
doctrine.
A particularly controversial area of punitive damage is succes-
sor liability. Under the successor liability theory, "a corporation
acquiring all or substantially all of another corporation's assets,
may 'inherit' the tort liability of the selling corporation. 1 59 Some
courts have prohibited recovery of punitive damages from succes-
sor corporations.160 Other courts, concerned with the ease with
which succeeding legal entities can merge or consolidate, have au-
thorized the imposition of punitive damages against successor cor-
a tort not involving death for which the tortfeasor is responsible are not affected by the
death of either party before or during trial, except that. . . the death of the tortfeasor
terminates liability for punitive damages.
RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 926(b)(1979).
158. Johnson v. Rinesmith, 238 So.2d 659 (Fla. App. 1969); National Bank of Bloom-
ington v. Norfolk & Western Railway Co., 73 MIl. App. 2d 160, 383 N.E.2d 919 (1978); Perry
v. Melton, 299 S.E.2d 8 (W. Va. 1982); Hofer v. Lavender, No. C-2552 (Tex. July 11, 1984).
159. Special Project, supra note 2, at 830. Traditionally, the mere sale of a corporation
does not impose liability on the successor for the tort liabilities of the predecessor. See
Travis v. Harris Corp., 565 F.2d 443 (7th Cir. 1977); Knapp v. North Am. Rockwell Corp.,
506 F.2d 361 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 965 (1975); Cyr. v. B. Offen & Co., 501
F.2d 1145 (1st Cir. 1974); Shane v. Hobam, Inc., 332 F. Supp. 526 (E.D. Pa. 1971); Klober-
danz v. Joy Mfg. Co., 288 F. Supp. 817 (D. Colo. 1968). There are four generally recognized
exceptions in which liability may be imposed on the successor: contractual assumption of
the tort liabilities of the predecessor; a transaction that is tantamount to a merger of the
predecessor with the successor corporation; the operation of the predecessor as a mere con-
tinuation of itself through the successor corporation; and the fraudulent transfer of assets in
an effort by the predecessor to escape liability. See Leannais v. Cincinnati, Inc., 565 F.2d
437 (7th Cir. 1977); R. G. Enstrom Corp. v. Interceptor Corp., 555 F.2d 277, 278 (10th Cir.
1977); Knapp v. North Am. Rockwell, 506 F.2d 361 (3d Cir.) cert. denied, 421 U.S. 965
(1974); Bonee v. L & M Const. Co., 518 F. Supp. 375 (M.D. Tenn. 1981); Menacho v. Adam-
son United Co., 420 F. Supp. 128 (D. N.J. 1976); Hernandez v. Johnson Press Corp., 70 Ill.
App. 3d 664, 388 N.E.2d 778 (1979). Recently, some jurisdictions have rejected the general
rule that precluded successor liability in favor of "product line" liability based on the socio-
economic policy of risk distribution. See Amader v. Johns-Manville Corp., 541 F. Supp. 1384
(E.D. Pa. 1982); Ray v. Alad Corp., 19 Cal. 3d 22, 560 P.2d 3 (1977); Ramirez v. Amsted
Indus., Inc., 86 N.J. 332, 431 A.2d 811 (1981). More recent decisions have categorically re-
jected the product line concept of liability. Weaver v. Nash Int'l, Inc., 562 F. Supp. 860
(S.D. Iowa 1983); Cowan v. Harris Corp., PROD. Lm. REP. (CCH) 1 9667 (D. Kan. Dec. 7,
1982); Gonzalez v. Rock Wool Eng'g & Equip. Co., 117 Ill. App. 3d 435, 453 N.E.2d 792
(1983); Fenton Area Public Schools v. Sorensen-Gross Constr. Co., 124 Mich. App. 631, 335
N.W.2d 221 (1983). Punitive damages could not be imposed on a successor corporation
under the standard that requires the vicariously liable entity to have authorized its employ-
ees or agents to engage in the intentional, wanton, or willful conduct at the time of the
product's design and marketing. See supra notes 105-09 and accompanying text.
160. Special Project, supra note 2, at 832-33.
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porations. 161 The courts authorizing recovery of punitive awards
against successor entities appear to be result oriented. These
courts seemingly are concerned with providing a "deep pocket" for
the plaintiff, whatever the successor corporation's relationship to
its predecessor. Obviously, the successor corporation neither
designed, manufactured, nor sold the product that caused the in-
jury. Consequently, neither punishment nor deterrence are served
by the imposition of punitive damages for a predecessor's defective
product-unless retribution against innocent parties is contem-
plated under the punitive damage doctrine.
Some jurisdictions authorize punitive damages in loss of con-
sortium actions.162 These courts predicate their decisions on the
compensatory, rather than the punitive, purpose of the actions.
Other jurisdictions reject recovery of punitive damages for loss of
161. See, e.g., Neal v. Carey Canadian Mines, Ltd., 548 F. Supp. 357, 391 (E.D. Pa.
1982) (successor corporation liable for punitive damages arising from tort that predecessor
corporation committed because "successor is essentially identical to that of the predecessor
corporation"). Recently, in Martin v. Johns-Manville Corp., 469 A.2d 655 (Pa. Super. 1983),
appeal filed, Apr. 2, 1984, the Pennsylvania Superior Court authorized the award of puni-
tive damages from a successor corporation as the result of the plaintiffs sustaining
bronchogenic carcinoma from exposure to asbestos supplied by defendant's predecessor cor-
poration. Relying on Campus Sweater & Sportwear Co. v. M. B. Kahn Constr. Co., 515 F.
Supp. 64, 107 (D.S.C. 1979), afl'd, 644 F.2d 877 (4th Cir. 1981), Sturm, Ruger & Co. v. Day,
594 P.2d 38, 47 (Alaska 1979) cert. denied 454 U.S. 894 (1981) and Gryc v. Dayton-Hudson
Corp. 297 N.W.2d 727, 741 (Minn. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 921 (1980), the Martin court
held that punitive damages constituted a deterrent against manufacturers maximizing prof-
its by marketing defective products. The court also addressed the issue of imposing punitive
damages on a successor corporation not responsible for manufacturing and marketing the
defective product. The court declared:
We believe, however, that in some circumstances a successor should be held ac-
countable for the recklessness of its predecessor. This will be so when the goals that
underlie the imposition of punitive damages-punishment and deterrence-will be ad-
vanced. . . . The fact that the successor does not continue the product line recklessly
marketed by the predecessor, or cures the defect, will not necessarily preclude punitive
damages .... We therefore hold that punitive damages are recoverable against a suc-
cessor corporation when the plaintiff has shown such a degree of identity of the succes-
sor with its predecessor as to justify the conclusion that those responsible for the reck-
less conduct of the predecessor will be punished, and the successor will be deterred
from similar conduct.
469 A.2d at 667. The extension of punitive damages to an innocent successor corporate en-
tity demonstrates the blind commitment of courts to this archaic doctrine and a certain
nalvet6 as to the economic effects of the imposition of punitive damages.
162. See, e.g., Sheats v. Bowen, 318 F. Supp. 640 (D.C. Del. 1970); Kohl v. Graham,
202 F. Supp 895 (D.C. Colo. 1962); Atlanta Life Ins. Co. v. Stanley, 276 Ala. 642, 165 So. 2d
731, 738 (1964) (when husband can prove loss of society because of wife's injuries, "the
assessment of reasonable compensation therefore must necessarily be left to the sound dis-
cretion of the jury") (emphasis added).
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consortium.1" Understandably, permitting a punitory award in
this context is difficult to justify under any of the rationale es-
poused by jurisdictions that recognize punitive awards.
Another patchwork application plaguing the punitive damage
concept is the applicability of insurance coverage to such awards.
Assuming that punitive awards are intended as punishment and
deterrence, it is an insupportable contradiction to permit the
wrongdoer to insure against wrongful acts that merit punitory de-
terrence. A majority of jurisdictions conclude that public policy
forecloses the application of insurance coverage for punitive
awards. 1 ' Essentially, these decisions conclude that permitting the
wrongdoer to shift the financial burden would detract from the de-
terrent effect of the punitive award. Moreover, extending insurance
coverage would, in effect, transfer the burden of the punitive
award to the innocent consuming public through increased pre-
mium payments. Other jurisdictions hold that insurance coverage
is a matter of private contract between the insurance company and
the insured and, therefore, requires no public policy considera-
tions.16 5 These jurisdictions ostensibly ignore the very policy that
undergirds the punitive damage concept-punishment and deter-
rence against future wrongdoing-and permit the wrongdoer to in-
sure against liability for such awards. The result, of course, is to
permit a windfall to the plaintiff at the expense of innocent con-
sumers who must pay increased premium rates for their insurance
policies. The dichotomy in attitude among the various jurisdictions
regarding the public policy of sanctioning insurance coverage
163. See, e.g., Fireman's Fund Am. Ins. Co. v. Coleman, 394 So. 2d 334, 341 (Ala.
1980) (only damages for loss of services allowed in derivative actions by spouses); Moran v.
Stephens, 265 So. 2d 379, 380 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972) (husband cannot recover punitive
damages in derivative action to his wife's action for dog attack injuries); Hammond v. North
Am. Asbestosis Corp., 105 IMI. App. 3d 1033, 435 N.E.2d 540 (1982), afl'd, 454 N.E.2d 210
(II1. 1983); Hughey v. Ausborn, 249 S.C. 470, 154 S.E.2d 839, 842 (1967)(the intentional
wrong is not committed against the spouse).
164. Dorsey v. Continental Casualty Co., 730 F.2d 675 (1984); Northwestern Nat'l Co.
v. McNulty, 307 F.2d 432 (5th Cir. 1962); City of Products Corp. v. Globe Indem. Co., 88
Cal. App. 3d 31, 151 Cal. Rptr. 494 (1979); Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. United States
Concrete Pipe Co., 369 So. 2d 451 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979); Brown v. Western Casualty &
Sur. Co., 484 P.2d 1252 (Colo. App. 1971); Guaranty Abstract and Title Co. v. Interstate
Fire and Casualty Co., 228 Kan. 532, 618 P.2d 1195 (1980).
165. See Price v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 108 Ariz. 485, 502 P.2d 522
(1972); City of Cedar Rapids v. Northwestern Nat'l Ins. Co., 304 N.W.2d 228 (Iowa 1981);
First Nat'l Bank of St. Mary's v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 283 Md. 228, 389 A.2d 359 (1978);
Anthony v. Frith, 394 So. 2d 867 (Miss. 1981); Harrell v. Travelers Indem. Co., 279 Or. 199,
567 P.2d 1013 (1977); Lazenby v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 214 Tenn. 639, 383
S.W.2d 1 (1964); Hensley v. Erie Ins. Co., 283 S.E.2d 227 (W. Va. 1981).
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against punitive damage awards lends further credence to the con-
clusion that the punitive damage concept represents an archaic
doctrine that serves no useful public policy, but which continues
only to enhance the largesse dispensed to the plaintiff.
The flawed nature of the punitive damage doctrine is clearly
evident in the total absence of any uniformity of application. The
legal rationale formulated to justify the concept is fraught with
contradictions and is totally unpredictable in its effect. The anach-
ronistic nature of the doctrine bespeaks the imperative need to rel-
egate the doctrine to its rightful place in the archives of history.
Most importantly, not only does the punitive damage doctrine not
achieve the ordained objectives of punishment and deterrence, but
rather, it presents an unfettered destructive force that erodes the
economic stability of society. Surely, a doctrine possessing such
questionable credentials and engendering such disquieting conse-
quences should sound its own death knell.
V. RATIONALE FOR ABOLISHING PUNITIVE DAMAGES
A. The Adverse Economic Results of Punitive Damages
Because juries possess essentially limitless discretion in award-
ing punitive damages, 6" the amount of punitive damages awarded
in recent years, as if feeding upon itself, has escalated to astro-
nomical figures that boggle the mind.167 Judge Friendly forecast
this problem: "The legal difficulties engendered by claims for puni-
tive damages on the part of hundreds of plaintiffs are staggering.
...We have the gravest difficulty in perceiving how claims for
punitive damages in such a multiplicity of actions throughout the
166. Duffy, supra note 9, at 8; Ellis, supra note 10, at 20; Special Project, supra note
2, at 695.
167. See, e.g., Maxey v. Freightliner Corp., 665 F.2d 1367, 1369 (5th Cir. 1982) afl'd,
722 F.2d 1238, 1242 (5th Cir. 1984) (court found evidence inadequate to support jury verdict
of $10,000,000 in punitive damages, but on appeal following remand affirmed the trial
court's remittitur of the award to $450,000); Dorsey v. Honda Motor Co., 655 F.2d 650, 654-
58 (5th Cir. 1981) ($5,000,000 verdict upheld), modified, 670 F.2d 21, cert. denied, 459 U.S.
880 (1982); Airco, Inc. v. Simmons First Nat'l Bank, 276 Ark. 486, 492, 638 S.W.2d 660, 663
(1982) (upholding award of $3,000,000 as vindictive damages); Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co.,
119 Cal. App. 3d 757, 821-24, 174 Cal. Rptr. 348, 389-91 (1981) (affirming trial court decision
to reduce $125,000,000 jury verdict to $3,500,000); Palmer v. A.H. Robins Co., No. 81SA149
(Colo. June 4, 1984) (en banc) (approving $6,200,000 in punitive damages compared to an
award of $600,000 in compensatory damages); Toyota Motor Co. v. Moll, 438 So. 2d 192
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (approving $3,000,000 punitive damages award); Gryc v. Dayton-
Hudson Corp., 297 N.W.2d 727, 741 (Minn. 1980) (affirming punitive damages in amount of
$1,000,000) cert. denied, 449 U.S. 921 (1980).
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nation can be so administered as to avoid overkill."16 Several com-
mentators have expressed concern over the possible severe eco-
nomic effects precipitated by huge punitive damage awards."' 9 Al-
though some commentators and courts have indicated that
punitive damages have not yet produced the prophesied doom,7 0
one recent scholarly article has cited the severe economic conse-
quences of asbestos litigation that forced several formerly large
and viable companies into the bankruptcy courts."' Fear of bank-
ruptcy earlier this year prompted the Fifth Circuit to declare a
universal abolition of punitive awards in industry-wide asbestosis
litigation within its jurisdiction.17 2 Although the Fifth Circuit did
not extend its moratorium on exemplary damages beyond the
realm of asbestos related litigation, the court's decision represents
a gargantuan step toward the intelligent and overdue recognition
of the inappropriateness and inherent destructiveness of the puni-
tive damage concept in the modern tort reparations system.
Even Professor Owen, who formerly supported the award of
punitive damages with few limitations, 17 has recently come to rec-
ognize the folly of continued and unbridled awards of exemplary
damages. Professor Owen recently foreshadowed the Fifth Circuit's
opinion in Jackson when he observed that "[1]arge assessments of
punitive damages may not yet be a major threat to the continued
viability of most manufacturing concerns, but the increasing num-
ber and size of such awards may fairly raise concern for the future
168. Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832, 839 (2d Cir. 1967). Another
jurist noted that the destructive economic effects of punitive damages awards will impact
"upon business and professional persons, firms and corporations, as well as upon ordinary
persons when engaged in a wide variety of activities." Harrell v. Travelers Indem. Co., 279
Or. 199, 209-10, 567 P.2d 1013, 1018 (1977). As an example, see Ratner v. Sioux Natural Gas
Corp., 719 F.2d 801, 805 (5th cir. 1983), acknowledging that allowance of an award of puni-
tive damages against a bankrupt corporation would deprive legitimate creditors of any re-
covery and "would be overkill."
169. Ellis, supra note 10, at 33-63; Owen, supra note 9, at 119-21; Sales, supra note 2,
at 380-81.
170. See Sales, supra note 2, at 380. The Court in Moore v. Remington Arms Co., 100
Ill. App. 3d 1102, 1111, 427 N.E.2d 608, 616-17 (1981), however, noted: "The tide has since
turned; judgments for punitive damages are now routinely entered across the nation, and
staggering sums have been awarded."
171. Special Project, supra note 2, at 806-45. Manville Corp., Unarco, and Amatex
Corp. have declared bankruptcy under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978
because of litigation expenses, and compensatory and punitive damage awards related to
asbestos cases. Id. at 808.
172. See Jackson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 727 F.2d 506 (5th Cir.), reh'g en banc
granted, - F.2d - (5th Cir. 1984) (discussed supra notes 123-26 and accompanying
text).
173. Owen, supra note 88, at 1257.
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stability of American industry."'174 Professor Owen also has noted
with alarm that courts increasingly have abdicated their traditional
responsibility to control highly questionable punitive awards.17 5 He
has suggested several possibilities for establishing upper limits for
future punitive damage awards.1
7 6
A byproduct of the continued success that plaintiffs have ex-
perienced in obtaining large punitive damage awards is the now
universal practice of plaintiffs alleging and demanding punitive
damages in an effort to increase the ultimate recovery from ju-
ries, 7 7 and to compel defendants to settle meritless cases because
of the fear that a jury will return an outrageous punitive damage
award. 17 8 Because of the discretionary nature of jury verdicts, a
"verdict will not be disturbed as excessive unless it is so clearly so
as to indicate that it was the result of passion, prejudice, partiality,
or corruption; or that it was manifestly the result of disregard of
the evidence or applicable rules of law.' 7 9 Although some courts
have overturned large punitive awards that shock the judicial con-
science or are manifestly unjust, 80 the simple fact is that most
huge punitive awards are affirmed. 181 This trend is creating a sig-
174. Owen, Problems in Assessing Punitive Damages Against Manufacturers of De-
fective Products, 49 U. Cm. L. REv. 1, 6 (1981); see Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc.,
378 F.2d 832, 841 (1967) (the impracticality of imposing an effective ceiling on punitive
awards in hundreds of cases against a single manufacturer, when added to large compensa-
tory damages, could lead to catastrophic awards).
175. Owen, supra note 174, at 57.
176. Owen, supra note 9, at 119 (suggesting upper limit of greater of (1) double the
compensatory damages, or (2) litigation costs plus $10,000); Owen, supra note 174, at 48
(suggesting possible upper limit on punitive damages of $1,000,00 per plaintiff).
177. Duffy, supra note 9, at 11 (trial tactics now are geared to exploit the punitive
damages doctrine).
178. Special Project, supra note 2, at 840 (five asbestos manufacturers formed an alli-
ance to reduce the risk of any defendant "settling out" on the others).
179. Riegel v. Aastad, 272 A.2d 715, 717-18 (Del. 1970). One reason that appellate
courts find it difficult to overturn punitive damage awards is because the standards of re-
view by which courts evaluate the excessiveness of these awards are extremely unclear. See,
e.g., Professional Seminar Consultants v. Sino Am. Technology Exch. Council, Inc., 727 F.2d
1470, 1473 (9th Cir. 1984). The Ninth Circuit recognized in Professional Seminar Consul-
tants that the standard of review for punitive damages in California is unclear. Compare
Cher v. Forum Int'l, Ltd., 692 F.2d 634, 640 (9th Cir. 1982) (clearly erroneous standard),
cert. denied 103 S. Ct. 3089 (1983) with Hasson v. Ford Motor Co., 32 Cal. 3d 388, 650 P.2d
1171, 185 Cal. Rptr. 654 (1982) (substantial evidence standard), cert. dismissed, 103 S. Ct.
1167 (1983). Judicial failure within a particular jurisdiction to provide even a consistent
standard of review to prevent punitive damages from getting completely out of hand is
disconcerting.
180. Riegel v. Aastad, 272 A.2d at 718.
181. See, e.g., Dorsey v. Honda Motor Co., 655 F.2d 650, 657 (5th Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 103 S. Ct. 177, modified, 670 F.2d 21 (5th Cir. 1982) (actual damages of $750,000
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nificant threat to the stability of our economy. It is now time for
courts and legislatures to reconsider the propriety of the punitive
damages concept before it creates even more havoc and places our
economy at risk. The punitive damage concept, if it ever possessed
legitimacy in the civil tort system, surely is an anachronism whose
time for service long since has passed and whose insatiable appe-
tite no longer can be afforded.
The current availability of the punitive damage doctrine im-
poses excessively oppressive and burdensome discovery on defen-
dants. Adhering to the philosophy of liberal discovery, courts os-
tensibly have concluded that the mere claim for punitive damages
entitles the plaintiff to demand the production of interminable
reams of documentary and other information potentially related to
the issue of punitive damages.182 For example, an increasing num-
ber of products liability plaintiffs incorporate an allegation for pu-
nitive damages, and concomitantly, the breadth and scope of court
ordered discovery has expanded with this additional claim. Ram-
pant abuse in the discovery process is economically ruinous to de-
fendants, disruptive of the orderly administration of justice, and
an unsightly blemish on the tort reparations system. Predictably
the public perceives the unfettered discovery process as an unac-
ceptable misuse of the legal system. Consequently, the defendant
must choose between the Scylla of economically devastating dis-
covery costs that can transform a favorable verdict into a pyrhhic
economic victory and the Charybdis of outrageous and unwar-
and punitive damages of $5,000,000 affirmed); Airco, Inc. v. Simmons First Nat'l Bank, 276
Ark. 486, 638 S.W.2d 660 (1982) (actual damages of $1,070,000 and punitive damages of
$3,000,000 affirmed); Vossler v. Richards Mfg. Co., 143 Cal. App. 3d 952, 192 Cal. Rptr. 219
(1983) (actual damages of $25,000 and punitive damages of $500,000 affirmed); Palmer v.
A.H. Robins Co., No. 81SA149 (Colo. June 4, 1984) (en banc) (actual damages of $600,000
and punitive damages of $6,200,000 approved as reasonable); Ford Motor Co. v. Nowak, 638
S.W.2d 582, 585 (Tex. Ct. App. 1982) (actual damages of $400,000 and punitive damages of
$4,000,000 affirmed).
182. For example, in Jampole v. Touchy, 673 S.W.2d 569 (Tex. 1984), the Texas Su-
preme Court authorized virtually unlimited discovery and noted, "The documents showing
GMC's knowledge of alternative designs are relevant to show conscious indifference in sup-
port of Jampole's claim of gross negligence." Id. at 573. Similarly, in General Motors Corpo-
ration v. Lawrence, 651 S.W.2d 732 (Tex. 1983), Justice Ray, in a concurring opinion relat-
ing to a discovery order, commented: "The scope of discovery in product defect cases may
be permissibly wider, especially when the plaintiff is alleging grounds for the award of exem-
plary damages." Id. at 734. Similarly, the inclination to expand discovery for punitive alle-
gations is reflected in other jurisdictions. See, e.g., Vollert v. Summa Corp., 389 F. Supp.
1348 (D.C. Hawaii 1975); Hughes v. Graves, 47 F.R.D 52 (W.D. Mo. 1969); Coy v. Superior
Court of Contra Costa County, 23 Cal. Rptr. 393, 373 P.2d 457 (1962); Kuiper v. District
Court of Eighth Judicial District, 632 P.2d 694, 702 (Mont. 1981).
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ranted monetary settlements."' 3
B. Punishment and Deterrence Are Not Viable Theories for
the Imposition of Punitive Damages
The purpose of the civil law historically has been to provide a
remedy to compensate individuals injured by the wrongful conduct
of others.184 Even disinterested commentators such as Dean Pros-
ser have noted the dichotomy of authorizing punishment under the
aegis of the civil law,185 and one court perceptively has observed:
It is difficult on principle to understand why, when the sufferer by a tort has
been fully compensated for his suffering, he should recover anything more.
And it is equally difficult to understand why, if the tortfeasor is to be pun-
ished by exemplary damages, they should go to the compensated sufferer, and
not to the public in whose behalf he is punished.'88
183. An example of the public's concern with the effect of unwarranted settlements is
reflected in an editorial appearing in the Houston Post, September 3, 1984. Commenting on
a lawsuit that was tried in the District Court in San Antonio, Texas and then settled with
General Motors, the editorial stated:
A lawsuit settled out of court last week in San Antonio is an example of how far
downhill our legal system has tumbled.
The passenger in a Pontiac TransAm sued General Motors for $50,000,000 after he
was seriously injured in an accident. Testimony indicated the driver was drunk and
traveling at 90 miles per hour.
But instead of suing the driver, the injured passenger sued GM, alleging the auto
maker's advertising of the TransAm made the driver believe it was a stunt vehicle that
could perform beyond the limits of a normal production car.
To any reasonable person, three errors are obvious in the story. First, the wrong
party was sued. The driver was at fault, not General Motors. It seems no one these
days is willing to take responsibility for his own actions. It's always someone else's
fault. However, it doesn't take too much imagination to figure out why GM was sued
instead of the driver: GM is richer.
Second, GM should not have settled. This is perhaps more understandable; GM
wanted to avoid a long trial and the publicity.
Third, and the most obvious of all, the court should have thrown the lawsuit out at
the first hearing. Judges and prosecutors repeatedly tell us dockets are overcrowded,
but it is hard to empathize when frivolous lawsuits like this one are allowed to
proceed."
Houston Post, Sept. 3, 1984, at 13, col 1.
184. See Western Union Tel. Co. v. Guard, 283 Ky. 187, 197, 139 S.W.2d 722, 727
(1940); see also W. PROSSER, supra note 34, § 2, at 7.
185. Dean Prosser referred to punitive damages as an "anomalous respect" in which
"the ideas underlying the criminal law have invaded the field of torts." W. PROSSER, supra
note 35, § 2, at 9.
186. Bass v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 42 Wis. 654, 672 (1877). Interestingly enough, the
Bass opinion went on to accept the theory of punitive damages because of stare decisis.
Wisconsin recently continued this inexplicable adherence to an outdated doctrine in
Wangen v. Ford Motor Co., 97 Wis. 2d 260, 279-80, 294 N.W.2d 437, 448 (1980):
Although controversy continues to surround the doctrine of punitive damages in the
twentieth century, and although some have questioned whether tort law-which is
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Another court, ever more emphatically, queried:
How could the idea of punishment be deliberately and designedly installed as
a doctrine of civil remedies? Is not punishment out of place, irregular, anom-
alous, exceptional, unjust, unscientific, not to say absurd and ridiculous, when
classed among civil remedies? What kind of a civil remedy for the plaintiff is
the punishment of the defendant? 87
As one commentator has observed, juries possessing neither exper-
tise in deciding what constitutes just punishment nor skill in de-
termining who should be punished are inflicting large punitive
damage awards even though society has not deemed it appropriate
to declare the offending conduct criminal.188 Parties to civil litiga-
tion are subject to quasi-criminal fines, and courts are enforcing
these penalties without the safeguards afforded even society's
worst criminals. 189
A particularly egregious aspect of the punitive damage doc-
trine as punishment is its application within the vicarious liability
field.190 Not only are courts inappropriately using punishment in a
civil context, but by imposing on employers and principals liability
for the punitive damages otherwise assessable against their em-
ployees and agents, the courts have diverted punishment from the
wrongdoers to innocent parties.191 One commentator has noted
designed to compensate an injured plaintiff-should also serve the function of the
criminal law, i.e., to punish a defendant for the purpose of deterring him and others
from further offenses, this court has consistently and frequently said that punishment
and deterrence are important considerations in the law of torts in Wisconsin.
187. Fay v. Parker, 53 N.H. 342, 382 (1873). Unlike Wisconsin, see supra note 186 and
accompanying text, New Hampshire followed its instincts and limited punitive damages to a
compensatory nature.
188. Duffy, supra note 9, at 10.
189. For example, juries have unlimited discretion in determining the amounts of pu-
nitive awards, whereas criminal fines must be fixed, and the burden of proof of civil punitive
damage liability is established by a preponderance of the evidence and not evidence beyond
a reasonable doubt. Likewise, civil defendants do not receive the protection against double
jeopardy and, therefore, are subject to civil punitive damages and criminal fines for the
same act. Similarly, civil defendants are subject to punitive awards on behalf of innumera-
ble plaintiffs, thereby making any upper limit of liability nonexistent. Also, most crimes
require a guilty intent. Finally, civil defendants subject to exemplary damages do not enjoy
the protection against self-incrimination. See W. PROSSR, supra note 35, § 2, at 11; Duffy,
supra note 9, at 9; Sales, supra note 2, at 363-64; see also Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell,
Inc., 378 F.2d 832, 839 (punitive damages could amount to tens of millions of dollars while
the maximum criminal penalty would be three years imprisonment and a $10,000 fine for
each of 12 violations).
190. See K. REDDEN, supra note 1, at 630 ("The imposition of punitive damages is
particularly offensive in the field of vicarious liability .....
191. One scholar has stated:
If the purpose of awarding punitive damages is to compensate, the normal public
policy reason for imposing vicarious liability would appear applicable. But if the pur-
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critically that "it is beyond reason to fathom why an innocent em-
ployer should be held liable for more than compensation of the
plaintiff's injuries.' ' 9 Punishment and deterrence of the innocent
does not comport with a system dedicated to the administration of
justice.
Courts have long used the "deep pocket" rationale to justify
the vicarious liability of employers and principals for compensa-
tory damages."9" Although this theory arguably possesses merit for
compensatory damages, its use to extend punishment against em-
ployers and principals is insupportable under the guise of any the-
ory or rationale.9 For example, even though punitive damages
against individual wrongdoers may be awarded in a section 1983
action,19 5 neither the municipal nor the local government can be
held vicariously liable for its employees' wanton and malicious con-
duct.19 Irrespective of the care that employers exercise, they pos-
sess no means to identify and prevent each and every employee
from engaging in antisocial acts. 97 Therefore, employers should
not suffer punishment for conduct that they cannot prevent.
When an employer has attempted to screen employees during
the hiring process, in an effort to hire the best available workers
for business reasons, the imposition of punitive damages for a "hir-
ing mistake" lacks any deterrent effect."' One expert has criticized
pose of punitive damages is to deter, as it is in the vast majority of jurisdictions today,
the penalty is certainly of questionable effectiveness and justice if not imposed on the
employee. The inequity is especially acute in the case of corporations where innocent
stockholders ultimately bear the punitive burden.
K. REDDEN, supra note 1, at 35.
192. Id. at 631.
193. The "deep pocket" theory rests upon "the desire to insure that victims of tortious
injury can reach a defendant with sufficient wealth to provide adequate compensation." El-
lis, supra note 10, at 64. Employers generally are better able to meet this compensatory
burden. Id. at 64-65.
194. See Duffy, supra note 9, at 12-13. The concerns of the "deep pocket" rationale
for uncompensated plaintiffs obviously do not apply to punitive damages, which theoreti-
cally perform direct punitive and deterrent functions. Ellis, supra note 10, at 65.
195. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982); see Smith v. Wade, 103 S. Ct. 1625 (1983) (defendant's
conduct must be motivated by evil motive or intent).
196. See City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247 (1981) (municipality
may be held vicariously liable for acts of its employees).
197. Duffy, supra note 9, at 12-13.
198. Id. Many courts accept deterrence as one of the bases for punitive damages. See
supra notes 47-60 & 64-70 and accompanying text. Deterrence can be specific-of the indi-
vidual defendant-or general-of other possible defendants. The strongest deterrrence argu-
ment for punitive damages is specific deterrence. Some doubt exists as to whether exem-
plary awards accomplish this specific goal, and no empirical studies exist. Duffy, supra note
9, at 10-11. This uncertainty is especially strong when the individual defendant to be de-
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the "make-weight argument" that punitive awards will result in
better hiring practices and asserts that the "absurdity" of this ra-
tionale should be "apparent to anyone who has ever been in the
position of offering employment-there simply is no way to gauge
whether a potential employee will become violent when irritated,
just as there is no method of determining with certainty whether
he will be a good worker."' 99 Another commentator also has ob-
served, while discussing the lack of meaningful standards or limits
on the amounts of punitive damages which a jury awards, that
"[flrom a deterrence standpoint, it confounds understanding to
permit such vast uncertainty as to the level of the expected pen-
alty. 2 °O Another scholar has asserted that high compensatory
damages will have a sufficient deterrent effect, anyway; and if they
do not, then the plaintiff can seek injunctive relief, the violation of
which will subject the defendant to contempt proceedings and
fines or jail.
201
In addition, imposing vicarious liability for punitive damages
creates the anomalous situation that the consumers or taxpayers in
a community, who are the intended beneficiaries of the punish-
ment administered to the wrongdoer, actually absorb the conse-
tarred is a corporate entity. The imposition of a punitive award cannot deter an employer if
the employee's act is intentional. Conversely, the employee will not be deterred when the
employer is made to pay a punitive award. Ellis, supra note 10, at 68-69. Moreover, the best
selection and supervision methods available do not, and cannot, prevent occasional impul-
sive behavior by employees, and the larger the employer the less any possible deterrent
effect because the large employer simply lacks that degree of total control and supervision of
employees. J. GHAURDI & J. KmcHER, supra note 9, § 2.08, at 19-21.
The general deterrent effect of punitive damages, likewise, is highly doubtful. Several
noted authors term it "highly unlikely" that the civil law imposition of punitive damages
will achieve the same goal of deterrence associated with the criminal law because: most peo-
ple do not know what punitive damages are; those people who generally know what punitive
damages are, do not know enough to appreciate the intended deterrent effect; and even
sophisticated members of the public are compelled to make "judgment calls" regarding the
type of conduct that will be subject to punitive damages. Id. § 2.09, at 23-24; see K. REDDEN,
supra note 1, at 116 ("there is really nothing for which the employer can be punished, and
... punitive liability is unlikely to encourage employers to use more care in screening or
training their employees").
199. K. REDDEN, supra note 1, at 631.
200. Schwartz, Deterrence and Punishment in the Common Law of Punitive Dam-
ages: A Comment, 56 S. CAL. L. REv. 133, 141 (1982) (discussing the decision in Grimshaw v.
Ford Motor Co., 119 Cal. App. 3d 757, 174 Cal. Rptr. 348 (1981), in which the appellate
court affirmed the trial judge's reduction of punitive award from $125,000,000 to $3,500,000,
but implied that it would have affirmed the trial court's acceptance of the $125,000,000
award or a reduction to $1,000,000).
201. Duffy, supra note 9, at 10; see Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d at
841 (compensatory awards have punitive elements, which would be more pronounced if pu-
nitive damages were eliminated).
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quences of the punishment. Ultimately, it is the innocent consumer
and taxpayer who bears the burden of paying for the punitive
award imposed upon a vicariously liable employer, corporate en-
tity, or governmental body. 02 "The fact of the matter is that the
liberal rules governing vicarious liability for punitive damages al-
low the wrong person or entity to be punished. '203 If an employer's
hiring practices are so outrageous that society should punish them,
the most appropriate forum is the criminal justice system, which
metes out punishment according to predetermined rules and only
against the party guilty of wrongdoing.
Not only is the punishment rationale of punitive damages de-
cidedly inappropriate in a civil law context and the effect of the
deterrence rationale minimal at best and unlikely at worst, but any
redeeming value these rationales might have dwindles in the face
of the ratio rule and the application of liability insurance. The ra-
tio rule generally mandates a reasonable relationship between the
amount of compensatory and punitive damages.204 A majority of
jurisdictions currently rejects any precise ratio rule.20 5 Commenta-
tors have criticized the current approach to the ratio rule because
the judicial refusal to establish a predetermined ratio creates un-
certainty in assessing quasi-criminal fines;0 6 and when courts ap-
ply a ratio, whether on an ad hoc basis or subject to some general-
ized ratio guidelines,20 7 the concept of gearing the size of the
202. Realistically, employees of an employer or corporate entity seldom, if ever, in-
demnify the vicariously liable employer. Consequently, the ultimate "punishment" adminis-
tered by the punitive damage doctrine is assessed in the form of higher insurance premiums,
higher prices for services, and higher product costs that are spread across the entire section
of innocent consumers or taxpayers. Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d at 841.
Likewise, creditors, sellers, suppliers, and distributors ultimately may pay the cost of the
punishment meted out by the punitive damage doctrine without ever having committed a
wrongful act. Ellis, supra note 10, at 66; see K. REDDEN, supra note 1, at 116 (losses will fall
not on the employer, but on the public through price increases, or on innocent shareholders
who never receive any benefit from the torts of corporate employees).
203. J. GHIARDI & J. KmCHER, supra note 9, § 2.04, at 12.
204. See supra notes 127-35 and accompanying text.
205. See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
206. Duffy, supra note 9, at 8; Sales, supra note 2, at 367 & n.82.
207. As noted by the court in Leingruber v. Claridge Assoc., 73 N.J. 450, 375 A.2d
652, 656 (1977):
The major difficulty in establishing the amount of the punitive damage recovery is
the absence of any defeinitive [sic] standard or criterion to guide the trier of fact in
determining the proper amount.
One major objection to the "ratio" rule is that it collides with the rationale for




punitive award to the compensatory award simply does not mesh
with the punishment rationale of punitive damages.208 The applica-
bility of liability insurance to cover punitive damage awards totally
vitiates the punishment and deterrence rationales. A majority of
jurisdictions has judicially declared that punitive damages are in-
surable. 0 9 The courts that refuse to allow insurance coverage on
public policy grounds recognize that insurance negates the objec-
tives purportedly served by punitive damages.2 10 The allowance of
insurance reduces the punishment of the wrongdoer while simulta-
neously imposing the effects of the punishment on all other policy
holders through the vehicle of increased premiums. Permitting pu-
nitive damage insurance likewise conflicts with the deterrence ob-
jective by reducing the incentive to avoid loss-creating conduct.
211
This incongruous situation recently prompted one court to ac-
knowledge that the punitive damage doctrine, as applied today,
does not deter tortfeasors and, because of the unpredictable man-
ner in which fact finders impose damages to punish, insurance
should be permitted to provide coverage against exemplary dam-
ages. 12 More importantly, however, liability insurance for exem-
plary damages makes necessary the assessment of larger awards to
achieve punishment and deterrence, which in turn causes insur-
208. If courts intend punitive damages to punish the defendant, then the wrongdoer's
conduct constitutes a more important consideration than the amount of damage the plain-
tiff suffers, although compensatory damages represent the basis against which the punitive
damages are compared. Leimgruber v. Claridge Assoc., 73 N.J. 450, 375 A.2d, 656 (1977); see
generally Ellis, supra note 10, at 58-59. Professor Ellis asserts that, although one can form
arguments that will theoretically justify the ratio rule, in reality "it invites juries to engage
in wealth redistribution and exacerbates the perverse incentives already created by uncer-
tain standards of punitive damage liability and the lack of functional criteria for the magni-
tude of assessments." Id. at 62-63.
209. These courts adopt the position of Lazenby v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co.,
214 Tenn. 639, 383 S.W.2d 1 (1964) (public policy not violated by allowance of insurance
coverage for punitive damages). Almost all courts allow insurance coverage for vicarious pu-
nitive damage liability. Ellis, supra note 10, at 71 (citing Dayton Hudson Corp. v. American
Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 621 P.2d 1155, 1160 (Okl. 1980)); Morrissey, Punitive Dam-
ages-Insurability, 25 TRIAL LAW. Gum 257 (1981); Owen, supra note 88, at 1313 n.276
(1976).
210. See, Ellis, supra note 10, at 71 (citing Northwestern Nat'l Casualty Co. v. Mc-
Nulty, 307 F.2d 432, 441-42 (5th Cir. 1962)). Recently, in United States Concrete Pipe Co. v.
Bould, 437 So. 2d 1061 (Fla. 1983), the Florida Supreme Court determined that insurance
coverage would apply to punitive damage liability of an entity deemed vicariously liable, but
would not apply to the individual responsible for the egregious conduct.
211. Ellis, supra note 10, at 74.
212. First Bank v. Transamerica Ins. Co., - F. Supp. - (D.Mont. 1984) (implicit
in the court's analysis is recognition of the fact that punitive damages serve as nothing more
than windfalls for plaintiffs).
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ance costs and coverages to rise, which will, in turn, necessitate
even larger punitive awards.213 This circularity epitomizes the il-
logical nature of punitive awards.
Neither the punishment nor the deterrence rationale is appro-
priate in a civil law context. The entire concept of punitive dam-
ages today in civil actions is a wrong idea at the wrong time.
214
C. Compensation Is Not a Viable Theory for the Imposition of
Punitive Damages
The usual rationale for punitive damages is punishment and
deterrence.1 5 A few jurisdictions, however, continue to view puni-
tive damages as a form of compensatory award for intangible inju-
ries.21 Irrespective of the viability of this rationale in earlier
times,2117 the concept simply no longer is relevant. Compensatory
awards currently provide recovery of all costs for physical injuries,
disfigurement, physical impairment, loss of earnings and earning
capacity, past and future medical expenses, past and future pain
and suffering, past and future mental anguish, loss of society and
companionship, and every conceivable intangible and imagined in-
jury such as emotional distress 18 and insult.2 19 Additionally, third
parties such as spouses, children, and parents increasingly can re-
cover compensatory awards for the intangible harms of loss of con-
sortium, loss of parentage, loss of society, and loss of companion-
213. Ellis, supra note 10, at 75-76. The Second Circuit has noted another dilemma
that liability insurance raises. If courts allow liability insurance for punitive damages, then
the cost of providing arguably needless deterrence rests on the consuming public. If courts
do not allow such insurance, then a sufficient egregious mistake can destroy a business,
thereby punishing innocent stockholders. Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d at
841.
214. Even the ancient concept of satisfying the public's desire for revenge is outdated.
As one author tersely observed, "vengeance is a questionable objective for a civilized legal
system." Note, The Assessment of Punitive Damages Against an Entrepreneur for the Ma-
licious Torts of His Employees, 70 YALE L.J. 1296, 1298 (1961). Society has long since
progressed beyond the primitive concept of an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth.
215. See supra notes 48-60 and accompanying text.
216. See supra notes 71-76 and accompanying text.
217. See supra notes 17-30 and accompanying text.
218. Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 730-31, 441 P.2d 912, 914, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72, 74
(1968) (en banc); Portee v. Jaffee, 417 A.2d 521 (N.J. 1980); W. PRossER, supra note 34,
§ 12.
219. Ellis, supra note 10, at 16-17. Professor Ellis cites the interesting case of Forde v.
Skinner, 172 Eng. Rep. 687 (Horsham Assizes 1830), in which the court held that cutting off
the hair of female paupers in a poor house, if done "with the malicious intent imputed [by
the evidence] of 'taking down their pride,' . . . that will be an aggravation and ought to
increase the damages." Ellis, supra note 10, at 17.
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ship. ° Undoubtedly, the most eloquent condemnation of punitive
damages as a form of compensation is etched in an early Washing-
ton case:
There is nothing stinted in the rule of compensation. The party is fully com-
pensated for all the injury done his person or his property, and for all losses
which he may sustain by reason of the injury, in addition to recompense for
physical pain, if any has been inflicted. But it does not stop here; it enters
into the domain of feeling, tenderly inquires into his mental sufferings, and
pays him for any anguish of mind that he may have experienced. Indignities
received, insults borne, sense of shame or humiliation endured, lacerations of
feelings, disfiguration, loss of reputation or social position, loss of honor, im-
pairment of credit and every actual loss, and some which frequently border
on the imaginary, are paid for under the rule of compensatory damages. The
plaintiff is made entirely whole. The bond has been paid in full. Surely the
public can have no interest in exacting the pound of flesh.
2 2 '
Considering the expanded and virtually unlimited access to com-
pensatory damages, punitive damages simply provide a windfall to
the plaintiff, penalize the innocent consumers or society, and un-
necessarily sap the vitality of the economy upon which society is
totally dependent.
2 22
The punitive damage doctrine theoretically is unsound, legally
insupportable, economically unnecessary for plaintiffs, and eco-
nomically disastrous for both defendants and innocent consumers.
Therefore, it is time, and in fact, the hour grows late, for the legis-
latures and courts to dismantle this potentially destructive doc-
trine of another era. Neither right nor justice, neither fairness nor
equity, and neither the vitality of the tort reparations system nor
economic considerations warrant the survival of this outdated
doctrine.
220. Ellis, supra note 10, at 28; see Sanchez v. Schindler, 651 S.W.2d 249 (Tex. 1983)
(Texas Supreme Court rejected over 100 years of judicial interpretation of the Wrongful
Death Act to redefine pecuniary loss to permit recovery of loss of society and mental
anguish). Even recovery for emotional upset in the absence of any physical injury is now
recoverable. See, e.g., Betancourt v. J. C. Penny Co., 554 F.2d 1206 (1st Cir. 1977).
221. Spokane Truck & Dray Co. v. Hoefer, 2 Wash. 45, 25 P. 1072 (1891).
222. Some commentators argue that "common sense makes it difficult to disbelieve
that the possibility of a hefty punitive jury verdict would not deter a rational and reputable
manufacturer." See J. GHIARDI & J. KmcHER, supra note 9, § 6.07, at 24. But see Ellis,
supra note 10, at 3 n.9 ("The burden of persuasion lies with the proponents of imposing
punitive damages; if the question of whether imposing punitive damages promotes valid
objectives cannot be persuasively answered in the affirmative, the damages are not justifia-
ble and should not be imposed"). The vague and meaningless nature of the "reckless and
wanton" standard as a basis for imposing punitive damages is exemplified in International
Armament Corp. v. King, 674 S.W.2d 431 (Tex. Civ. App. 1984).
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VI. THE ALTERNATIVE IN THE ABSENCE OF TOTAL ABROGATION OF
PUNITIVE DAMAGES
One commentator observed that the issue of punitive damages
in the past "merited scant attention" because such awards were
"rarely assessed and likely to be small in amount."22 Unfortu-
nately, the tort reparations situation today has changed drastically,
and the antiquated concept of punitive damages as applied in the
1980s poses serious, if not potentially fatal, consequences. If a com-
plete abrogation of the punitive damage doctrine is not an achiev-
able objective, then a series of coordinated and precisely defined
limitations is imperative to forestall the economically and doctri-
nally debilitating effects of this concept.
First, it is necessary to formulate certain standards of conduct
and proof by which the fact finder determines punitive damage lia-
bility. Realistic and meaningful standards presently are nonexis-
tent, and confusing jury instructions only serve to further the con-
fusion of juries. Either the courts or the legislatures should
authorize the recovery of punitive damages only upon a stringent
showing that a defendant acted with deliberate intent, ill motive,
or maliciousness.225
Second, the courts should require a significantly higher stan-
dard of proof than the less exacting "preponderance of the evi-
dence" burden. The degree of proof required should be elevated to
223. Ellis, supra note 10, at 2.
224. See supra notes 77-103 and accompanying text. Professor Ellis asserts that the
vagueness of standards for determining liability and the wide discretion of juries in deter-
mining amounts of punitive damages extends "Hability far beyond that justified by fair-
ness." Ellis, supra note 10, at 76.
225. One authority has stressed that substituting the terms "outrageous" or "flagrant"
for the current vague terms would be useless because these words are just as elastic as those
now in use. Ellis, supra note 10, at 51. The courts must realize the importance of strictly
construing even "deliberate intent," "ill motive," and "maliciousness" standards. See
Cooter, supra note 8, at 80 (proposing that courts should allow punitive damages only for
intentional faults, which would include only gross or repeated conduct).
A bill currently before the United States Senate would limit the imposition of punitive
damages in product liability cases to situations in which the defendant manufacturer or
product seller acted with "reckless disregard. . . for the safety of product users, consumers,
or persons who might be harmed by the product." S. 44, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. § 12(a)(2)
(1984). The Senate bill further defines "reckless disregard" as "conscious, flagrant indiffer-
ence to the safety of those persons who might be harmed by a product and an extreme
departure from accepted practice." Id. § 12(j) (emphasis added). A similar bill before the
United States House of Representatives deletes the word "conscious" and would require
only that the defendant act "with a flagrant indifference to consumer safety. . . and an
extreme departure from accepted practice." H.R. 5214, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. § 11(b) (1984)
(emphasis added).
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a "clear and convincing" standard228 or a "beyond a reasonable
doubt" burden.227 The Second Circuit, based upon its assertion
that conduct which would "give rise to punitive damages must be
close to criminality," recently stated that the plaintiff must clearly
establish this degree of behavior by the defendant.2 28 Because the
punitive damages concept represents an anomalous perversion of a
criminal law concept grafted to the civil law, and considering the
weaknesses inherent in the rationale underlying the punitive dam-
age doctrine in today's society, the wisest course strongly suggests
the adoption of the more stringent "beyond a reasonable doubt"
burden of proof.
Third, it is necessary to reallocate judicial power so that
judges, rather than unknowledgeable juries, decide if punitive
damages are merited, and if so, in what amount.2 9 Judges,
equipped by experience and familiarity with legal concepts, are
226. Professor Owen recently recommended that courts institute a "clear and convinc-
ing" evidentiary test. He recognized that such a test might sacrifice a degree of efficiency in
favor of some fairness, but fairness over efficiency and the concept that close cases should be
resolved in favor of the accused are exactly what the American legal system should epito-
mize. See Owen, supra note 9, at 118-19 (ratio of additional innocent parties who get pun-
ished to the number of additional guilty parties who get punished by an expansion of the
rule of punitive damages may be unfairly high). In Gavica v. Hanson, 101 Idaho 58, 608 P.2d
861, 864 (1980), the court suggested that punitive damages generally are not favored and
should be awarded only upon clear evidence. Similarly, in Town of Jackson v. Shaw, 569
P.2d 1246, 1252 (Wyo. 1977), the court observed that "[p]unitive damages are not a favorite
of the law, are to be allowed only with caution within narrow limits and have been the
subject of much controversy." And, in Gent v. Collinsville Volkswagen, Inc., 116 Ill. App. 3d
496, 451 N.E.2d 1385, 1391 (1983), the court acknowledged that "[b]ecause of the penal
nature of such damages,. . . the law disfavors them. . . ." See Acosta v. Honda Motor Co.
v. Moll, 717 F.2d 828, 839 (3d Cir. 1983) (en banc) (need to prove "outrageous" conduct by
clear and convincing proof); Travelers Indem. Co. v. Armstrong, 442 N.E.2d 349, 360 (Ind.
1982) (the court announced a change to "clear and convincing evidence"); S. 44, 98th Cong.,
2d Sess. § 12(a)(2) (1984) (requiring "clear and convincing" proof); K. REDDEN, supra note
1, at 124-25 (advocating that courts increase the burden of proof to a "clear and convincing"
standard); see also Note, Criminal Safeguards and the Punitive Damages Defendant, 34 U.
Cm. L. REv. 408 (1967).
227. See Schwartz, supra note 200, at 144 (the American legal tradition indicates that
incriminating facts must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt before punishment can be
inflicted, but under the punitive damage doctrine the civil law awards millions of dollars
based on a preponderance of the evidence standard).
228. Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d at 843. The Second Circuit re-
quired only that the plaintiff clearly establish the defendant's recklessness. The term "reck-
less" lends itself to much confusion and arbitrariness, and therefore, courts should employ
the more stringent standards of deliberate intent or maliciousness.
229. See H.R. 5214, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. § 11(b), (c) (1984) (proposing that the court,
rather than the jury, decide punitive damage liability and amount). But see S. 44, 98th
Cong., 2d Sess. § 12(b), (c) (1984) (proposing that court decide the amount of punitive dam-
ages, but allowing jury initially to determine if defendant is liable for them).
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better able than inexperienced juries to distinguish behavior that
justifies punishment, 30 and hopefully would be able to avoid the
bias and naivete that jurors express through inflated punitive
awards. Many judges currently support such a realignment of du-
ties.231 If responsible jurisprudence mandates punishment through
civil law remedies, it is only logical to utilize the knowledge of judi-
cial officers to achieve fair and rationale results. Punitive damages
awards have become too large, too destructive, and too far removed
from economic reality to allow biased and rhetorically enraged ju-
ries to continue on their present course.3 2
Fourth, specific limits should be established for punitive dam-
ages awards. 3 Such limitations would curtail the current destruc-
tive abuses of the doctrine and would eliminate the current inordi-
nate number of outrageous awards. Professor Owen has suggested
a limitation of either twice the amount of compensatory damages
or the the plaintiff's costs plus $10,000.2 3" A well-known example of
a legislatively imposed limit on punishment oriented damages is
the treble damage provision in the Clayton Act that allows actual
damages plus twice their value as punitive damages for violations
230. See Mallor & Roberts, Punitive Damages: Toward a Principled Approach, 31
HASTINGS L.J. 639, 670 (1980) (suggesting that "the very power of the remedy demands that
judges exercise close control over the imposition and assessment of punitive damages");
Owen, supra note 9, at 120 (recommending reallocation of judicial power because of the
experience of judges and because judges have less rigid preconceptions that might bias deci-
sions); see also Torres v. North Am. Van Lines, Inc., 135 Ariz. 35, 658 P.2d 835, 841 (1983)
(discussion of the role of experienced trial judge controlling punitive damages award).
231. See Schwartz, supra note 200, at 146-47 (a questionnaire that the California Leg-
islature's Joint Committee on Tort Liability submitted to California's Superior Court judges
indicated that 56% of those judges who responded favored vesting in the trial court the
authority to determine both when to award punitive damages and in what amount); see also
Mallor & Roberts, supra note 230, at 664 (endorsing judicial determination of the appropri-
ateness of punitive awards).
232. The jury in Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 119 Cal. App. 3d 757, 174 Cal. Rptr.
348 (1981), rendered a punitive damage award of $125,000,000 for a single claim. More re-
cently in Durgill v. Ford Motor Co., C.A. 79-3203A-28th Dist. Ct. of Nueces Co., Texas
(1983), the jury rendered a verdict of $6,800,000 in actual damages and $100,000,000 in pu-
nitive damages for a single claim.
233. See H.R. 5214, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. § 11(d) (1984) (limiting punitive awards to
twice the amount of actual damages, and never allowing punitive damages to exceed
$1,000,000 for any one claimant). The House bill also would permit the court to consider
any prior punitive damage awards levied against the defendant. Id. § 11(e). A mathematical
formula, as H.R. 5214 proposes, in the hands of an experienced trial judge might lead to
equitable results. One commentator, however, has suggested that allowing a jury to consider
prior punitive awards in an effort to minimize any current exemplary damages could back-
fire and cause a jury to fine a defendant even more harshly. K. REDDEN, supra note 1, at
122-23.
234. See supra note 176.
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of the antitrust laws.285 Whether legislatures validate a dollar for
dollar ratio or a single established amount, an equitable and work-
able upper limit is essential to control the undisciplined punitive
damages doctrine. A dollar for dollar ratio presents the arguable
advantage of flexibility that automatically would fluctuate both
upward and downward, depending upon the amount of compensa-
tory damages. A ratio limit also presents the danger, however, that
juries artificially will inflate compensatory awards to increase the
possible punitive amount. The logical solution, therefore, is to view
the dollar for dollar ratio as an upper limit, subject to judicial re-
duction.2 6 Unlike the Clayton Act treble damage provisions,
judges would retain the authority to exercise discretion in reducing
punitive awards below the statutorily allowed upper limit.
Fifth, the application of the punitive damage doctrine must be
modified significantly in the strict tort liability context of product
litigation. The legislature should declare that punitive damages
may be awarded only once. If a plaintiff establishes that he suf-
fered injury because a defendant supplied a product containing a
design or marketing defect, then the plaintiff should receive total
compensation for the injury. When hundreds or even thousands of
plaintiffs prosecute claims for injuries that emanate from a single
design or marketing defect that exists in a single line of a product,
however, the product supplier should not endure multiple punish-
ments for a single design defect. The product supplier is deemed
liable simply because of the condition of the product-a single de-
sign defect in a particular product. If the civil law is to embrace
the added function of punishing product suppliers, then a single
235. The Clayton Act provides in pertinent part:
Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything
forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor in any district court of the United
States in the district in which the defendant resides or is found or has an agent, with-
out respect to the amount in controversy, and shall recover three-fold the damages by
him sustained, and the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee.
15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (1982) (emphasis added). Professor Redden provides an excellent discus-
sion of federal statutes that expressly provide for punitive damages, federal statutes that
expressly preclude punitive awards, and federal statutes that are unclear on this issue. See
K. REDDEN, supra note 1, at 558-93.
236. Judge Friendly favored the power of judicial reduction of punitive awards when
writing the opinion in Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832 (2d Cir. 1967):
There is more to be said for drastic judicial control of the amount of punitive
awards so as to keep the prospective total within some manageable bounds. This would
require, for example, a reduction of the instant $100,000 award to something in the
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award for a single design deficiency is sufficient. To borrow a
phrase from Justice Holmes, "even a dog distinguishes between be-
ing stumbled over and being kicked, '2 7 and, as many asbestos
manufacturers well know, 238 the punitive damage doctrine has as-
sumed the form of strategically placed and excessively destructive
kicks.
Sixth, any exemplary damages permitted and recovered should
be payable to the state treasuries just like any other penal fines.239
Plaintiffs currently receive compensation for every conceivable ele-
ment of injury,240 and punitive damage awards should not consti-
tute a windfall for the plaintiff. Judicial transfer of punitive dam-
age awards to the state would prevent unnecessary and inequitable
windfalls to plaintiffs, would provide state funds that could be
used for public purposes, and would be consistent with all other
penal fines which are required to be paid to state treasuries.2 1
Seventh, if the punitive damage concept continues to survive
its archaic origins, courts should declare that insurance coverage
contravenes public policy. Punitive damage awards penalize inno-
cent purchasers of insurance who suffer increased premiums each
time a court concludes that liability insurance provides coverage
237. O.W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 3 (1881). As stated in In re Nothern District of
California "Dalcon Shield" IUD Products Liability Litigation, 526 F. Supp. 887, 899 (N.D.
Cal. 1981), vacated on other grounds, 693 F.2d 847 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct.
817 (1983), the purpose of punitive damages awards is "to sting, not kill, a defendant." But
see, Acosta v. Honda Motor Co., 717 F.2d 828, 838 n.15 (3d Cir. 1983) (en banc), in which
the court suggested punishment to destruction may constitute acceptable policy, or as the
court more succinctly noted, "[n]or is such a result necessarily untenable").
238. As noted by the court in Town of Jackson v. Shaw, 569 P.2d 1246, 1253 (Wyo.
1977), "The punitive allowance should be in an amount that would promote the public in-
terest without financially annihilating the defendants." See Martin v. Johns-Manville Corp.,
469 A.2d 655 (Pa. Super. 1983), which authorized punitive damages from a successor corpo-
ration for allegedly defective asbestos products supplied by a predecessor corporation. The
punished legal entity neither designed, manufactured, nor sold the alleged defective product
causing plaintiff's injury. In Morris v. Parke, Davis & Co., 573 F. Supp. 1324 (D.Cal. 1983),
the court carried the punitive damage doctrine to its illogical extreme. The court approved
the imposition of punitive damages on a defendant in a case in which strict tort liability was
initially predicated on the market share theory because the plaintiffs could not establish
that the defendant was the manufacturer or the seller of the injury causing product.
239. See S. 44, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. § 12(e), (f)(1) (1984) (suggesting that the amount
of punitive damages that a plaintiff can receive should not exceed the amount of compensa-
tory damages awarded, with any remaining punitive damages going to a court-determined
"public purpose"). The logic of this suggestion was recognized as early as 1877 by a court
that, unfortunately, refused to follows its own instincts. See supra note 186 and accompany-
ing text.
240. See supra notes 215-20 and accompanying text.
241. See Duffy, supra note 9, at 9.
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for such penalties.242 Increased premiums do not punish the wrong-
doer; they punish all innocent purchasers of insurance.
Last, and undoubtedly most important, the appellate courts
must initiate a more aggressive and standardized attitude in re-
viewing exemplary awards. Currently, appellate courts overturn a
punitive damage verdict as excessive only if it is the result of pas-
sion, prejudice, partiality, corruption, or is manifestly unjust.
243
Professor Owen recently recognized this problem and suggested
that appellate courts should scrutinize carefully the trial record
"for improper evidence, for argument that might have inflamed the
jury, and for the sufficiency of the evidence as a whole. ' 244 Appel-
late courts too long have summarily characterized the amount of
punitive damage awards as a fact issue for jury determination.
This attitude is an abdication of appellate review responsibility
and the results of such an abdication cannot be justified and
should not continue.
VII. CONCLUSION
Punitive damages may have served a valuable function in the
scheme of ancient law. The historical justifications for the doc-
trine, however, have long since become obsolete, particularly with
the current unfettered expansion of the compensatory damage sys-
tem. Because the punitive damage doctrine is monstrously archaic
and because of the distorted and arbitrary fashion in which it cur-
rently operates, the harm it causes is significantly greater than any
good it produces. In today's society, punitive damages merely cre-
ate a windfall for plaintiffs without serving either as a punishment
or a deterrence. The doctrine should be abolished because it is a
doctrine of a bygone age of the law.245 Abolishing the punitive
damage doctrine would leave unaffected the civil tort system that
242. See supra notes 209-13 and accompanying text.
243. See, e.g., Dempsey v. Auto Owners Ins. Co., 717 F.2d 556, 562 (11th Cir. 1983);
White v. Conoco, Inc., 710 F.2d 1442, 1448 (10th Cir. 1983); Moore v. American United Life
Ins. Co., 150 Cal. App. 3d 610, ., 197 Cal. Rptr. 878, 897 (1984); Riegel v. Aastad, 272
A.2d 715, 717-18 (Del. 1970); Leiragruber v. Claridge Assoc., 73 N.J. 450, 375 A.2d 652, 656
(1977).
244. Owen, supra note 174, at 57-58; see Warren v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 693 F.2d
1373, 1380 (11th Cir. 1982) (maximum limit is exceeded if award is "neither just nor
proper").
245. As the Fifth Circuit stated about an unrelated abusable relic, legal doctrines that
invite appeals and confuse judges, juries, and attorneys ought to be given a "quick and not
too decent a burial." United States v. Bailey, 468 F.2d 652, 668-69 (5th Cir. 1972), aff'd en
banc, 480 F.2d 518 (5th Cir. 1973).
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continues to compensate plaintiffs for every conceivable injury.
Furthermore, if punishment or deterrence is necessary, legislatures
should enact appropriate criminal statutes with the protections
that normally accompany the imposition of penal fines.
If abolition of this outdated doctrine is not accomplished, then
both logic and necessity require the imposition of severe restric-
tions to restrain the doctrine's ill-advised and economically devas-
tating effects. The law continually must change and adapt to fulfill
its noble purpose of insuring the fair and responsible administra-
tion of justice. This noble legal purpose is threatened by the on-
slaught of economically destructive punitive awards. Unless far-
sighted and aggressive judicial and legislative action is initiated,
the punitive damages doctrine will continue to wreak a form of
devastation never contemplated or intended in the evolution of the
tort reparations system.
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